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ABSTRACT 
 
Strides Toward Better Application Security 
 
by 
 
 
Sathyaraj Balasubramanian, Master of Science 
 
Utah State University, 2008 
 
 
Major Professor: Dr. Chad Mano 
Department: Computer Science 
 
 
 Static analysis tools analyze source code for vulnerabilities. However, these types 
of tools suffer from various problems that limit their effectiveness. This thesis examines 
these static analysis tools and suggests techniques for making them more efficient at 
detecting different types of vulnerabilities. 
  The thesis further analyzes possible causes for these vulnerabilities by examining 
the source code written by programmers of various categories. Finally, this thesis 
discusses solutions and techniques to improve general security awareness as well as the 
importance of secure coding among the students and software developers. 
 (131 pages) 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Security is a continuously evolving field. New techniques and technologies are 
rapidly being developed in order to ensure continued data security. Ironically, just as new 
technologies guide developers/programmers and system administrators in maintaining the 
security of a system, they also help hackers find new techniques to break-in to a system. 
The security of a system can be viewed at various levels (see Figure 1). The first of these, 
the physical level, is a situation in which the hacker has hands-on access to the system.  
Physical access is a fairly easy way of gaining access to any information stored in a 
system. At the next level, the network level, hackers compromise data moving through a 
network in which the target system resides, hence gaining access to information going in 
and out of the system.  For example, the man-in-the-middle attack and DNS poisoning 
are two examples of network level attacks that are well protected by good encryption and 
message source verification techniques, At the operating system (OS) level, specific 
vulnerabilities are exploited in order to gain access to the system. Any information about 
the target system, such as the type of operating system, the kernel version, etc., is 
valuable to the hacker and can be used for breaking-in to the target system. OS level 
security is getting better with good data execution prevention techniques, and with 
companies releasing immediate patches for any new vulnerability. The top level of 
security of a system is the application level.  This includes situations wherein the hacker 
targets a specific application running on the system and exploits its vulnerabilities to 
obtain sensitive information or even to take  
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Figure 1. Levels of security. 
control of the entire system. At some point, all of these layers are interdependent; 
vulnerability in one layer leads to vulnerability in a different layer. Thus, a simple bug in 
any of these levels can lead to the compromise of the entire system. 
 As the increasing use of firewalls and other kinds of protections make network- 
level security and OS-level security tighter and harder to exploit, hackers are moving 
towards exploiting specific application-level vulnerabilities. Unfortunately, while hackers 
are moving towards application vulnerabilities, not many software developers are 
focusing on secure coding and other application security techniques. More and more 
vulnerabilities are being reported to Bugtraq [1]. In fact, the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST) reports that 92% of vulnerabilities are in software [2]. 
With the vulnerabilities list increasing, it is necessary to find the source of such problems, 
look for patterns of vulnerabilities, and find new tools and techniques that can help in 
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reducing the number of vulnerabilities in software. Such an attack plan will help the 
developers produce high quality software.  
 To that end, static source analyzers are great tools for finding vulnerabilities/bugs 
in source code. For example, using a static source analyzer can help reduce the number of 
bugs, thereby increasing the overall quality of the software. However, there are many 
drawbacks to static analyzers keeping developers from using them. Key drawbacks 
include usability, false positive rates, and long analysis time. Nevertheless, because of 
static analyzers’ potential in computer security, addressing these drawbacks is very 
important. 
 This project is divided into two major sections.  The first section identifies and 
analyzes the understanding of computer security among undergraduates and developers. 
This analysis includes identifying common vulnerabilities in programming assignments, 
thereby giving a view of how students come to understand the security issues in software. 
The first section of this project investigates some of the common, current problems in 
analyzers that prevent developers from using them. The second section of this project 
includes suggestions for techniques to overcome common problems found in static 
analyzers, thereby increasing the popularity and usage of static analyzers among 
developers. 
 The rest of this thesis is divided into the following chapters: 
 Chapter 2 – Related Work: 
 This chapter presents an overview of related research in static analysis 
tools and common vulnerability analysis. It discusses various static analysis tools, 
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their performance analysis, common vulnerabilities in software, and secure 
coding principles and techniques.  
 Chapter 3 – Source Code Analysis:  
 Chapter 3 deals with the first section of this project, identifying and 
analyzing undergraduates’ and developers’ understanding of computer security. 
Chapter 3 discusses analysis performed on source code written by students and 
developers. First, an analysis was performed on student source code in order to 
understand students’ perspective on security. The aim was to identify and 
understand secure coding techniques and principles among students, as well as 
determine students’ level of concern regarding writing secure code. The next 
subsection in this chapter presents the results and analysis of source code from a 
technical interview forum. This was done because an analysis of the awareness of 
secure coding practices among the students who are about to join work fleshes out 
our understanding of security practices, in general.  Both analysis on student code, 
and code from an interview discussion forum were used to study the mistakes 
made by students while coding, given that students probably make similar 
mistakes when they join a company. 
 This chapter also presents the results of the analysis performed on code 
from open source software/projects and the results from the Bugtraq database. 
This project analyzed code from open source software as a means of learning 
common vulnerabilities found among developers within the industry. Incidentally, 
the common types of vulnerabilities found in open source software help 
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demonstrate that open source does not guarantee vulnerability-free software.   
 Because of the obvious link between the training students receive and the 
type of developers they become, this project analyzes computer security courses 
from various universities, and a suggested list of topics to be covered in computer 
security courses is provided. 
 Chapter 4 – Report on Current Static Analysis Tools:  
 Chapter 4 addresses the second major section of this project, suggestions 
for techniques to overcome common problems found in static analyzers. Chapter 4 
presents analyzes of various source code analysis tools to ascertain their false 
positive and false negative problems. Common test cases were written to find the 
weaknesses of these analyzers. The test code was run on all the static analyzers, 
and the output was analyzed. These test cases and the output produced by the 
static analysis tools are presented in this chapter.  
 Chapter 5 – False Results Resolution:  
 Chapter 5 also addresses the second major section of this project. This 
chapter discusses the proposed logic which, when implemented in source code 
analyzers, significantly reduces false positives and false negatives. False results 
are one of the major drawbacks in source analysis tools, and reducing them will 
entice more developers to use them [3]. The logic discussed in this section was 
implemented on a custom parser written for this research work. The results of 
running the same test cases over this custom-built parser are also discussed in this 
chapter.  The results clearly show that implementing these logics would definitely 
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improve the quality of the static analysis tools.   
 Chapter 6 – Summary and Conclusions: 
Finally, Chapter 6 summarizes the work done in this project, suggests 
directions for future work in this area, and provides concluding remarks.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
RELATED WORK 
 
 
 There has been a lot of research done in source code analysis and static analyzers. 
Static analyzers started getting attention in early 2000 when the first static analyzer, the 
ITS4, was introduced [1]. Since then, various other static analyzers have been introduced, 
each one improving on the previous ones. Improvements include better features, 
algorithms, and methodologies to scan source files and perform vulnerability analysis on 
them. Consequently, there has been a significant increase in how these tools perform 
analysis and identify vulnerabilities and bugs. 
 In [4], the authors provide a list of static analysis tools, along with a small 
description of these tools and their basic purpose. Also, a graph showing the running time 
of the analysis of various static analyzers is provided, but information such as the code 
used with these static analyzers, size of that code (i.e., number of lines) is not given. Also, 
the authors do not discuss some of the false positives and false negatives associated with 
performing the source analysis on the test code, a necessary component for evaluating a 
static analyzer’s effectiveness.  
 McGraw provides a list of source code analyzers and briefly discusses the rule 
sets and programming languages that these tools support [1].  He terms old static 
analyzers as first generation and latter ones as second generation static analyzers. A very 
similar description of various source code analyzers can be found in [5]. The paper also 
discusses the need for static analysis tools, but still, it does not show the false positive/ 
false negatives of these tools. A variety of journal articles [6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11] have been 
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written on static code analyzers and finding vulnerabilities in source code, but none of 
them emphasize techniques for writing a source analyzer, reducing the number of false 
positives and false negatives, and improving their runtime.  
2.1 Common Static Analysis Tools  
  The following are the most common static code analysis tools that have either 
been released or are currently under development/research. Some of these static analysis 
tools are open source, while others are commercial tools. 
2.1.1 ITS4   
ITS4 is one of the oldest source analyzers [1] around. It merely searches the 
source code for unsafe function calls, and flags them as security vulnerabilities. ITS4 
performs some basic lexical analysis [9] on the source code i.e., it breaks down the source 
code into a set of tokens, and matches these tokens with predefined rule sets. It suffers 
from lot of false positives. 
2.1.2 RATS   
RATS is a rough auditing tool for security that is very similar to ITS4, the primary 
difference being that ITS4 was targeted towards C and C++, whereas in addition to 
C/C++, RATS supports Perl, PHP, Python, and open SSL. It is an open source application 
and one of the earliest built static analyzers. RATS identifies the places that need 
attention and aids in finding security-related errors in the source code. Like ITS4, RATS 
produces a lot of false alarms [1]. 
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2.1.3 ARCHER   
ARCHER [20] is an array bounds checker program written in C [1, 12]. It helps in 
locating index access problems in C programs, thus eliminating the possibility of 
segmentation faults [12].  
2.1.4 CQual 
  CQual detects format string vulnerabilities in programs written in C [4]. In order 
for CQual to carry out this function, the program needs to be annotated [1]. 
2.1.5 Splint   
Splint is an extension of LINT.  It was created in 2002 for detecting vulnerabilities 
and coding mistakes in C/C++ applications[4]. Splint needs annotation to find buffer 
overflows and race conditions. Without annotation, it can perform some basic analysis on 
the source code [4]. However, for better results and analysis, it needs some kind of 
annotation in the source code.  
2.1.6 Sparse   
The Sparse project was started by Linux Torvalds in 2003 [13]. It was developed 
for kernel developers for finding bugs in kernel code and was initially designed to detect 
errors in mixing pointers between user space and pointers in kernel space. 
2.1.7 Coverity Audit  
A product of Coverity, Inc., Coverity Audit [14] is a commercial application that 
can detect various types of problems in C/C++ code, although Coverity Audit is also 
available for Java. Coverity Audit detects and lists errors in the source code. For 
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information on the location of the error, an additional product named Coverity Prevent 
needs to be installed. 
2.1.8 FindBugs  
FindBugs is a static analysis tool for programs written in Java. FindBugs was 
initially started as a research tool at the University of Maryland [1]. 
2.1.9 Fortify  
Fortify static analyzer [15] is a commercial product that supports various 
programming languages, including .Net, Cold Fusion, and PHP. Because Fortify can 
identify almost any type of software vulnerability, it has been an important part of the 
current project. The fact that it has some false positives and false negatives far outweighs 
the hassle involved in manually auditing the source code. 
2.1.10 Most Prominent Static Analysis Tools 
Coverity and Fortify are the two most prominent names in static analysis tools. 
Both of these companies have released a commercial product for static source analysis. 
These tools are more advanced than other static analyzers, and they support various 
languages. Both of these vendors are actively involved in source code analysis, 
improving the overall quality, and reducing false positives. Further, both companies have 
published numerous white papers that discuss next generation attacks, the future of 
source code analysis, and new techniques to improve the source analysis [6, 16] 
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2.2 Common Vulnerability Types and  
      How They Are Exploited 
 
This section discusses the most common types of vulnerabilities found in 
software. There are several types of vulnerabilities, and an explanation of all types of 
vulnerabilities is simply beyond the scope of this document. This project focuses only on 
a subset of the most commonly found vulnerabilities in software applications.  
2.2.1 Buffer Overflow 
One of the most common software vulnerabilities found, buffer overflow has been 
in existence for a long time. Even though the buffer overflow problem has been around 
for years and its cause and consequences have been published in various books and 
papers, it still remains at the top of the list of vulnerabilities. Buffer overflow can result in 
memory corruption which, in turn, can lead to an arbitrary execution of code [11]. Buffer 
overflow occurs due to improper handling of memory or improper bounds checking [11]. 
Both stack and heap memory are susceptible to buffer overflow.  When the program does 
not check for bounds or does not limit the size of the input based on allocated buffer 
space, the program can end up overwriting other parts of memory [17, 18], not allocated 
to or intended for storing input data.  Buffer overflow can be exploited by the attacker by 
feeding the program with malicious input data, or by inputting data that is bigger than 
what the program could handle. 
2.2.2 Integer Overflow 
 Similar to the buffer overflow problem, integer overflow is constrained to a 
particular data type, integers. In a normal X86 architecture, the size of an integer is 32 
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bits; there are also 64-bit processors in X86. Integer overflow occurs when a large integer 
value i.e., value greater than 2147483647 is stored in an integer variable [19]. Such an 
overflow causes memory corruption, thus leading to misinterpretation of data [19, 20]. 
Integer overflows are exploited by inputting large integer values where a normal integer 
value is expected. 
2.2.3 Cross-Site Scripting 
  Cross-site scripting has recently started gaining more attention, probably because 
of the increase in the number of web-based applications and the rapidly growing online 
population. The cross-site scripting vulnerability is most commonly found in web 
applications and web pages [4, 21]. Cross-site scripting allows hackers to embed their 
own scripts as a part of an organization’s website; hence, if a user visits the said webpage, 
the malicious script is executed in the client's web browser as if it were a part of the 
original webpage [21].  During most cases, users are unaware of this happening in their 
computer [4]. 
 Cross-site scripting occurs as a result of bad input processing or bad input 
validation [4]. Cross-site scripting can be exploited by writing a malicious script and 
saving it in a Java script file (JS file), by writing smart script tags that take in this JS file, 
or by feeding the unsecure website with malicious input [4, 22]. A simple example is an 
HTML page that gets a value from a user's form, passes the value to a script, and the 
script echoes back the form’s data to the user's screen without validating the value [22]. 
2.2.4 SQL Injection 
SQL injection is another commonly found vulnerability in web-based 
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applications. SQL injections occur when the application does not validate input data but, 
instead, directly use the input data as a part of an SQL statement [4, 22].Thus, when the 
SQL statement is executed without validating user input, a disaster may well result. A 
recent analysis showed that around half-a-million Microsoft-powered websites are 
vulnerable to SQL injection attack [23]. SQL injection is not restricted to web 
applications. Even the normal desktop applications that interact with the SQL servers are 
susceptible to this attack. A simple example is as follows: 




In this example the input from user is stored in the variable “uname”, the value in this 
variable is concatenated to the string variable “query1” , which is passed as a parameter 
to the execute function. When the user enters “user123; Delete * from USERDB;” as 
username, query1 will have the following value “select * from USERDB where 
user_name = user123; Delete * from USERDB;” and when this query is executed in the 
database server, all the data in USERDB will be lost. 
2.2.5 Format String  
Format string vulnerability occurs when the program does not handle the input 
string properly. Printf and similar printing routines have format string options that tell the 
function call how to interpret the data or the variable that needs to be printed.  These 
function calls are susceptible to the format string vulnerability [17]. If a string that needs 
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to be printed is directly given into one such call without formatting options, i.e., 
printf(userinput); instead of printf(“%s”,userinput);, a format string vulnerability that 
exposes the data in the program's stack can result [17]. 
2.2.6 Other Common Types of Vulnerabilities 
Other types of vulnerabilities include arbitrary file overwrite, DoS attack, 
privilege escalation, HTTP response splitting, memory leaks, double free, etc. Not 
checking the return value of a function call is a bad practice, especially when function 
calls, such as malloc or similar memory allocation functions, are used. The program 
should validate the return address before doing anything with it [4]. A recent paper 
published by IBM [24] gives an example in which the Flash player, a call to the calloc 
function is not checked against null, and the program just continues to write some values 
to the return address. As a result, an attacker could input some value to the program, 
thereby controlling the address to which the program writes the data [22, 24].  
 Arbitrary file overwrite is a vulnerability in which the program starts writing to an 
arbitrary file, and the file to which it writes is controlled by the attacker.  Arbitrary file 
overwrite can have disastrous consequences when a program is running in the root mode 
[17, 22]. The attacker can write anything to any file and, hence, can execute arbitrary 
code in the vulnerable system. DoS(Denial of Service) is a pretty common attack. In 
DoS, the attacker creates a situation in which a program does not respond to any user-
generated events/request. This is generally achieved by inputting malicious data that 
make the program crash or by putting the program into a busy state so that it does not 
respond to a user's request. HTTP response splitting occurs when a web page's http 
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response header contains an invalidated user input. The attacker can split the response 
into multiple HTTP responses by adding some extra data to the response. Memory leak 
occurs when the program calls a memory allocation function call and does not free that 
allocated memory [17,22]. This might result in a system running out of memory, thereby 
causing the system to not function properly. Double free is the opposite of memory leak. 
In this case, free is called on an address that was previously freed. This might result in 
unpredictable consequences. The authors of [22, 25] give a complete list of 
vulnerabilities that could be found in any software program. 
 Although configuration errors and weak access control could lead to security 
vulnerabilities, problems like buffer overflows, format string errors, SQL Injections, and 
memory leaks can occur due to bad programming practices or bugs in code. Such 
problems can be identified with the aid of static analysis tools. One real world example 
is, when a static analysis tool was used on SAMBA, an open source file sharing software, 
it identified about 915 vulnerabilities, which is definitely a huge number. More case 
studies and surveys prove that usage of static analysis tools helps in identifying security 
vulnerabilities in software [26, 27, 28, 29]. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
SOURCE CODE ANALYSIS 
 
 
 This chapter presents an overview of the common types of vulnerabilities found in 
various software. Also, as a part of this research, analyses on various source codes have 
been performed, the results of which are presented in this chapter. 
3.1 Analysis Reports 
 To have a better understanding of vulnerabilities, it was necessary to perform an 
analysis on various source codes that were available to us. These source codes include 
student source code, source code from some of the open source search engines, student 
discussion forums, and open source projects. Some parts were analyzed manually by 
going over the source code, but most of the source codes were analyzed with the help of 
the Fortify source code analyzer. 
3.1.1 Analysis I (Student Code) 
Currently, little research exists on analyzing student programming assignments 
with respect to the security factor. Indeed, very few research papers/journal articles are 
dedicated towards analyzing student code, ascertaining students' perspective on security 
issues, and students' knowledge of secure coding and source analysis tools. The analysis 
for this project started with student programming assignments. Students are taught how to 
program, but all too often, students do not learn how not to program [14]. So, it was 
necessary to analyze how students code their assignments, what type of mistakes they 
generally make while programming their assignments, and try to answer questions of 
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whether students consider security at all while coding. Because students ultimately 
become programmers and developers in industry, the basics of secure coding must be 
taught to students in order for students to carry those patterns with them when they code 
for a company. 
As the first step of analysis, student code was obtained from the department of 
computer science at Utah State University. Since this is not a funded project, it did not 
require any special approval from IRB. In order to protect the student’s privacy, a script 
to delete the comments from the top section of the source code, where students generally 
include their name, was written and was run over the students’ assignments. Later, 
courses from each level (freshmen, sophomore, junior, and senior) were selected for 
source analysis. Fortify software analyzer was used for scanning these source files, and 
parts of the source code were analyzed manually in order to verify the results produced 
by Fortify.  
Figure 2 shows the number of lines of code analyzed in each course level. The 
freshmen level course had assignments only in C/C++ language, and hence it had the 
highest number of C/C++ files. The sophomore level had the lowest number of lines of 
code. It had approximately 190,000 lines of code written in C/C++ and nothing in Java or 
C#. The junior level had a lot of code written in C/C++ and a few thousand lines in Java 
and C#. The senior level had an even higher number of C/C++ files and around 50,000 
lines of code written in Java. 
 Figure 3 shows the analysis report on student source code, including the total 
number of critical vulnerabilities at every course level. Figure 4 shows the number of 
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critical vulnerabilities present in students' assignments per thousand lines of code 
(KLOC), categorized based on course level. The patterns in Figures 3 and 4 are very 
similar. The overall mean number of errors per assignment is 1.4 and the standard 
deviation is 0.768. 
3.1.1.1 Freshmen Level. Freshmen level courses had about 900 vulnerabilities out 
of 1579 assignments analyzed. Obviously, these assignments are from a basic course, 
such as an introduction to C/C++ programming, wherein students are taught how to code 
in these languages and are given assignments including using if statements, writing 
switch cases, writing loops, basics input and output functions, file, and IO processing. 
Figure 5 shows the vulnerabilities found in freshmen level courses categorized based on 
the type of the vulnerability. Buffer overflow and string termination errors constitute the  
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Figure 2. Number of lines in student code. 
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Figure 3. Student code analysis. 
 
Figure 4. Vulnerabilities per KLOC. 
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highest number of vulnerabilities. 
3.1.1.2 Sophomore Level. Sophomore level courses had the lowest number of 
vulnerabilities compared to the other levels. They also had the lowest number of 
programming assignments, about 610 assignments. Typical courses at this level include 
data structures and algorithms, introduction to software engineering, computer 
organization/architecture, etc. Typical coding assignments include basic data structures 
implementations. The number of vulnerabilities here is less because there are fewer lines 
of code (see Figure 3). With both freshmen and sophomore level courses, buffer overflow 
and usage of dangerous functions, such as gets, unrestricted cin, etc., top the list with 
significant numbers. The category-based chart in Figure 6 shows that around 30% of the 
vulnerabilities found in this level are due to buffer overflow issues. 
 
 
Figure 5. Vulnerability chart for freshmen level courses.  
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Figure 6. Vulnerability chart for sophomore level courses. 
The following code snippet for unrestricted input illustrates a common 
vulnerability found at the sophomore level: 









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 3.1.1.3 Junior Level.  Next, junior level courses had the highest number of 
vulnerabilities, approximately 3500, which is directly proportional to the number of 
assignments, 1640, the highest among all the other levels. Junior level courses include 
operating systems, Java/internet, C# .NET.  Although buffer overflows and memory leaks 
comprise a big share of these vulnerabilities, another interesting type of vulnerability that 
was pretty dominant was command injection, which is about 22% of the total (see Figure 
7). The rise in command injection vulnerability is probably because students are not 
aware of the fact that passing invalidated input to function calls, such as system(), 
execv(), is a bad programming practice. As Hoglund and McGraw strongly emphasize 
[17], do not trust user input.  
 
 
Figure 7. Vulnerability chart for junior level courses. 
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The following code snippet for command injection illustrates a common 
vulnerability found at the junior level: 









 3.1.1.4 Senior Level.  Next up, in the senior level, the number of vulnerabilities 
dropped to around 1900. The total number of assignments analyzed in this level was 973. 
Senior level courses typically include computer security, network programming, object-
oriented programming, advanced algorithms, databases, etc. Enrollment in computer 
security courses and use of programming languages like C# and Java for object-oriented 
development probably account for the drop in the number of vulnerabilities from the 
junior level.  Nonetheless, as shown in Figure 8, the buffer overflow problem remains 
dominant in senior level courses as well as lower level courses. 
3.1.2 Analysis II (Tech Interview Forum) 
 The next analysis performed is very much related to student source code. Just 
about to finish school, what is the next thing a student probably does: look for a job. 
Going with that assumption, a popular interview-questions discussion forum [30] was 
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analyzed. Because students post their interview experiences there, and some even post 
solutions in terms of source code or in algorithm form, students make use of these 
websites to prepare for their interviews. These source codes were analyzed for security 
vulnerabilities. 
 As the thesis is focused on improving the overall security of an application and 
the security awareness among the students, it was necessary to perform this analysis 
which could give a better idea about students’ knowledge on secure coding. Although this 
analysis could reveal the weaknesses in educational system, it may not be possible to 
rectify them by merely teaching the student about various static analysis tools. The usage 
of such tools should also be made mandatory in every assignment submission. This could 
help the students in knowing the importance of application security and also make them 
better prepared for industry. 
There is absolutely no guarantee that only students discuss and post solutions, and 
there is absolutely no information on where and when people did their undergraduate 
work; nonetheless, it is still interesting and worthwhile to analyze these source codes and 
gather some information about their vulnerabilities. Figure 9 shows the result of the 
analysis of source codes posted on a technical interview discussion forum. Most of these 
were mostly written in C, C++, or Java. As can be seen in Figure 9, about 17% of these 
source codes had some kind of security vulnerability, and about 50% of those source 
codes having security vulnerabilities were posted in the Microsoft section. It should be 
noted that there is absolutely no relevance between this result and security vulnerability 
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Figure 8. Vulnerability chart for senior level courses. 
 
Figure 9. Tech interview forum analysis. 
 
26 
 
 
or the quality of Microsoft developed products in general. The results were categorized 
based on the company just to make the analysis and results more interesting. 
 Around 450 different source codes from the tech interview forum were analyzed, 
and various types of vulnerabilities were found in these source codes. Figure 10 shows 
the breakdown of the types of vulnerabilities found. Buffer overflow, missing null check, 
and integer overflow were the three major types of vulnerabilities observed, with these 
three having almost an equal share in the total number of vulnerabilities 
3.1.3 Analysis III (Open Source Community)  
 The purpose of this analysis was to find common vulnerabilities in open source 
projects. Search engines that search through various open source projects were used to 
perform the code search. These include Google Code Search, Krugle, and Codase. My 
specific goal was to check how many open source codes had some of the most obvious 
problems and followed very bad practices. Source code engines are not guaranteed to 
have indexed the latest version of the open source project, and hence, the results and 
analysis presented here are based on the version of source code indexed by these search 
engines. The following functions are considered to be insecure and were searched in open 
source code using all three search engines mentioned above. 
 3.1.3.1 gets().  Gets is a function call that gets the input data from stdin and saves 
it in a string. No matter how big the string buffer, any gets call is vulnerable. In general, 
when a search is made for a particular function call, the search engine lists more than 
1000 results. However for this project, only the first 50 results were analyzed for 
vulnerabilities. This applies to the following function calls, too. Out of the first 50 results, 
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Figure 10. Vulnerability chart for tech interview forum. 
most were an implementation of the gets call in various versions of glibc or other relevant 
projects. Still, any project that had this function call with a destination buffer was 
vulnerable to buffer overflow attacks. 
  3.1.3.2 strcpy(). The strcpy function copies the data from the source to the 
destination string. Strcpy is considered an insecure call because it does not check if the 
destination buffer is big enough to hold the data [17]. Instead, it starts copying the data 
from the source to the destination irrespective of how big or small the destination is. 
Hence, it is susceptible to buffer overflow, although it should be noted that strcpy can still 
be used safely if the programmer is pretty sure that the destination buffer is bigger than 
the source buffer. Again, a lot of results (especially from Google) were the actual 
implementation of the strcpy function from various libraries. But analyzing the other 
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source code reveals that every one of the seven strcpy calls was vulnerable.  
 3.1.3.3 Searching for Other Types of Vulnerabilities. Searching for SQL injection, 
off-by-one, or cross-site scripting errors is difficult in open source engines. Searching for 
regular expression like “select \* from “, or similar expressions yielded some results; 
however, most of these were irrelevant to SQL queries. Out of those that were useful to 
this discussion, most had a module that gets a parameter and passes that parameter into an 
SQL query. It may be that the parameter was already validated in some other module and 
was consequently a safe module inside that project. Nevertheless, a problem arises when 
that same module is used as a part of another project. In such cases, it probably ends up 
being vulnerable to SQL injection attacks. 
 Also, it was necessary to pick one of the most popular open source projects and 
see if it had any vulnerability. The Source Forge website lists the top ten open source 
project based on number of downloads and popularity. The popular open source project, 
Audacity, an open source program for editing audio files, was used for source code 
analysis. This program was chosen solely because it is in the top ten open source 
programs used. The Fortify source analyzer was used to scan the Audacity source code. 
Figure 11 shows the various types of vulnerabilities found in Audacity. Nearly  65% of 
the vulnerabilities were due to memory leaks. Buffer overflow and missing checks 
against null were also frequent.  
3.1.4 Analysis IV (Bugtraq) 
  Finally, I looked at the Bugtraq database for vulnerabilities being reported, and for 
whether those vulnerabilities were associated with open source or closed source software.  
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Figure 11 . Vulnerability chart for open  source project – Audacity. 
The results, shown in Figure 12, were collected over a period of two months. A 
longer collection period was beyond the scope of this project.  However, it would be 
interesting to see if a longer collection period resulted in different results. Figure 12 
shows the vulnerabilities reported to the Bugtraq database categorized by the type of 
vulnerability. It is evident from this figure that open source and closed source 
applications contribute equally to the vulnerabilities list. Be it buffer overflow or SQL 
injection, there is not much difference between number of vulnerabilities reported in open 
source applications and the number of vulnerabilities reported in closed source 
applications. 
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Figure 12. Vulnerabilities from Bugtraq database (March and April 08). 
3.2 Why Does Software End Up Having Vulnerabilities? 
 Vulnerabilities in software have been reported via various means for many years. 
Nonetheless, there are still a lot of applications with lots of security bugs in them. The 
Bugtraq forum is updated daily with numerous vulnerabilities in almost all types of 
software applications, from normal paint applications to the complex software firewalls.  
 There are a few vulnerabilities that have remained fairly dominant for the past 
several years, and buffer overflow is one of them. All software developers should be 
aware of the buffer overflow vulnerability, yet many buffer overflow vulnerabilities are 
continually being reported to Bugtraq. As software becomes more and more sophisticated 
and complex, it carries more vulnerability. Additionally, people find new ways of 
exploiting these vulnerabilities. Exploiting vulnerability can result in various things, of 
which the arbitrary code execution and privilege escalation are the most evil. In these, the 
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attacker can take the complete control of the system. 
3.2.1 Limitations of Open Source Software 
 Some people argue that having open source software by its very nature is very 
secure [7, 31]. But according to the Bugtraq database, there are an equal number of 
vulnerabilities in open source and closed source applications. In fact, Ranum, the 
innovator of firewall, states: “I don't think making software open source contributes to 
making it better at all. What makes good software is single-minded focus” [9:2]. Also, 
Spafford of Purdue asserts: “What really determines whether it is trustable is quality and 
care, was it designed well? Was it built using proper tools? Did the people who built it 
use discipline and not add a lot of features? A lot of the open source software out there is 
built by people who don't have experience, the tools,  the time, or the resources to do it as 
carefully as you would want in a highly trusted environment” [9:2] .  
 Also, many people have the misconception that open source software is being 
continuously watched by several people; hence, the software is well written. While it 
might be true that many people take a look at these open source codes, it is not certain 
that all of these people contribute to the project [1]. For example, Lawton uses Ranum’s 
firewall to illustrate the same point [9]. When Ranum released the firewall software, there 
were about 2000 sites using it to some extent, but only around 10 people had written back 
to Ranum and even less had submitted patches. Ranum was unimpressed with the open 
source community. Another example [1] is the ITS4 software, which is actually a static 
checker. When ITS4 was released as an open source software, there were around 15,000 
downloads during the first year, yet during the same time, not even a single rule was 
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added to its knowledge-base by the open source community [1]. So, open source software 
does not always guarantee that the software is secure enough. 
3.2.2 Insufficient Software Specifications 
 There are various reasons for software to be vulnerable. Writing secure software is 
probably a rarely mentioned requirement of a product. Mistakes or bugs could occur 
during any phase of development. McGraw indicates that as high as 50% of 
vulnerabilities are due to design issues [14]. Given that bugs due to design issues are 
harder and more costly to rectify than other types of vulnerabilities, this is an alarming 
number. Hence, the initial design should be strong enough to withstand attacks and 
should be free from bugs. 
 Most software designers give a higher priority to functional requirements than to 
the unspecified security requirements. This might be another reason why software 
applications suffer from vulnerabilities.  
3.2.3 The Programming Language   
 The programming language used for developing the software might actually play 
a significant role in the security of the application. Programming languages like Java and 
C# enforce more security in the code compared to C and C++ [4].  Indeed, it is probably 
easier to exploit software written in C or C++ compared to software written in any other 
programming language.  This is probably because both C and C++ libraries are written 
with more focus on performance rather than security. One obvious example is the strcpy 
function which does not check the bounds before copying the source into the destination 
buffer. Another example is the realloc function call which dynamically reallocates a 
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memory segment which was previously allocated using the malloc function call. The 
realloc function takes the memory address as one of its parameters and the new size as 
another parameter. So, if the new size is less than the old size, there is a possibility of 
buffer overflow occurring in the heap, because the realloc function does not check if the 
new size is less than the old size but, instead, immediately starts copying the data from 
old segment in to the new segment.  
Also, another primary reason why Java and .Net are more secure is because 
programs written in these languages run on top of a virtual machine. So, even if the 
program itself is exploited, the hacker gains control only over the virtual machine and not 
the actual system in which the virtual machine is installed. 
3.2.4 Awareness of Secure Coding Practices 
 Another important contribution to application-based security problems is 
university-level secure coding courses or the lack thereof. Probably not many universities 
offer courses on secure coding. For example, A Google search for "secure coding 
courses" does not return any information about universities that offers secure coding 
courses. McGraw sees this as one of the major problems in computer security [1]. Since 
secure programming courses are not typically a part of standard curricula, one cannot 
expect students to be aware of all types of vulnerabilities and good programming 
practices. McGraw lists some of the universities that offer courses related to software 
security [1]. There are only a handful of such universities, and most of these are highly 
ranked universities. This lack of computer security courses becomes even more troubling 
when one considers the industry itself.  
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Big organizations typically have lots of ongoing projects and enough resources to 
hire many good programmers. Because of their size, large organizations can afford to 
have a separate software security team that checks source code against all types of 
vulnerabilities.  But consider small organizations, especially start-ups. Such organizations 
obviously are not able to have a separate team for software security. Hence, the 
programmers themselves might spend some time on doing the source analysis. Also, 
small organizations might end up borrowing open source code in order to get their work 
done. 
As analysis II shows, open source search engines might end up throwing in some 
vulnerable code that will result in a vulnerable application. Also, most big organizations 
have secure code training programs for their employees. So, before the employee starts 
coding s/he has to undergo training, learn good programming practices, and get some 
knowledge about vulnerabilities and how to avoid them. Thus, they often end up doing a 
better job at creating secure software. Small organizations might not have these kinds of 
training programs for their employees.  
3.3 Building It Safe  
3.3.1 Offering Secure Coding Courses  
 Analysis-I provides a clear picture of security awareness among students. It is 
evident that not many students are aware of secure coding practices/standards. As 
mentioned earlier, not many universities offer courses on software security, secure 
coding, etc.  Among those universities that do offer software security and secure coding 
courses, the following are some of the common topics found among the various security 
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courses offered:  
 Secure software engineering  
 Cryptographic protocols  
 Access control techniques  
 Memory protection techniques  
 Buffer overflow attacks and defenses  
 DoS attacks and defenses  
 Format string vulnerabilities  
 Web security, XSS attacks and defenses  
 Case study on real world software vulnerabilities  
 Database security  
 Programming language-based security issues  
 Source code analysis tools 
 Offering such types of courses or at least covering these topics in security courses 
at every university would definitely improve the awareness of secure coding and software 
security vulnerabilities among the students.  Having a case study on real world software 
vulnerability would guide students in understanding the consequences of software 
vulnerabilities in an application and would have an impact on students’ awareness of the 
importance of secure coding. 
3.3.2 Better Software Design and Development Practices  
 Every organization has its own practices and follows the software life cycle model 
pertinent to its projects. There is no one-size-fit-all for software engineering practices or 
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software security. But irrespective of the various methodologies followed by various 
organizations, building secure software requires good practices right from phase one [9], 
i.e., security has to be built into the software right from the design phase.  
 McGraw also [1] suggests some software practices, known as touch points, for 
developing secure software. These software touch points work for iterative approaches, 
but a lot of companies now follow agile development practices. This is particularly true 
for many tech start ups. They start with a scratch idea, and they build software without 
really having a proper software requirement specification (SRS) document. Once the 
developers have a basic idea, they start coding. In such cases, it is easy for the developers 
to miss security features, as their main focus is developing a basic product initially and 
then improving the product. Adding security on top of an existing project can be tricky. 
An interesting example of a touch point is designing abuse cases [1]. This is a very 
important practice. Designing abuse cases makes the programmers think from the 
attacker’s perspective and helps them write some extra code to prevent security breaches 
from happening.  
3.3.3 Policies for Borrowing Code from Open Source  
 There are indications that many large organizations, including Google, Microsoft, 
and Amazon, borrow code from open source. For example google’s latest product, 
Chrome, a browser which is completely built with open source libraries, Microsoft uses 
open source code like jQuery, zlib , and MPI, and Amazon.com is entirely built over open 
source libraries [32, 33, 34, 35]. Analysis III and Analysis IV show that even open source 
software suffers from various types of software vulnerabilities; making software open 
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source does not guarantee a completely secure or vulnerability free software. Hence, 
organizations must follow a standard policy for adapting open source code and merging it 
into their proprietary product. Most companies/organizations might already have their 
own set of policies or practices for using open source code, but each one differs from the 
other. The following is a set of steps that an organization could take in order to use open 
source software as a part of its product. These steps are relevant only to security aspects; 
there might be other aspects of using open source code in an organization, such as legal 
issues, coding standards etc.. Such matters are beyond the scope of this project and are 
not covered in the following steps.  
 3.3.3.1 Run Static Analysis Tool. Static analysis tools simply make the job of 
source code analysis easier. It is a good idea to run the static analysis tool over the open 
source code to find the vulnerabilities in it. This will give a clear idea whether it is safe to 
use the open source code in the software product that the organization is developing. 
However, the company should be aware of the false positives and false negatives of the 
static analysis tools that are being used for the analysis. 
 3.3.3.2 Manual Verification of Code. Results from static analysis tools are 
obviously going to include false positives and false negatives. These can be eliminated by 
manual analysis of the source code. As mentioned earlier, static analysis tools are going 
to make this job a little easier because they spot the places that need a closer look. 
Manual auditing of the source code is very necessary for safe usage of the open source 
code. 
 3.3.3.3 Check for Unwanted Functionalities. Unwanted functionalities can 
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introduce vulnerability into the program. Open source code might have a lot of features 
that are not related to the product the company is developing, and it is good idea to 
remove these unwanted functionalities from the source code. Also, open source code 
might have malicious code in it. Because the source code is modified by hundreds of 
people online, the source code is not always to be trusted. So, checking for unwanted 
functionalities and malicious code and removing them helps eliminate the possibilities of 
vulnerabilities in the company's software product. 
 3.3.3.4 Analyze The Effects of Integration on Security. Adding a new module to 
the current project is always going to introduce uncertainty into the project. The new 
module might affect the current code in any way. This is not only with respect to the 
functionality of the program but also with respect to the security aspect of the program. 
When an open source code is added to the current project, it is necessary to analyze the 
effect of adding the new piece of code. The open source code might be completely void 
of vulnerabilities and be totally secure as a separate module, but merging the open source 
module into the current project might introduce new vulnerabilities into the program. 
Hence, it is necessary to analyze the effects of integration of new modules on security.  
3.4 Using Static Analysis Tools 
 Use of a static code analyzer is a must in all projects. Though static analyzers will 
not pinpoint the exact spots of vulnerabilities and suggest methods to rectify them [1, 4, 
10], they definitely give an overview of the most probable vulnerable components in code 
and bring them into the view. Using static analyzers definitely improves the overall 
quality of the software product. As mentioned earlier making the static analyzers as 
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standard part of student’s assignments will help the students understand various coding 
mistakes and vulnerabilities caused by it, and also ways to avoid these vulnerabilities. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
REPORT ON CURRENT STATIC ANALYSIS TOOLS 
 
4.1 Finding Vulnerabilities in Software 
 Finding vulnerabilities in software is not an easy task, although there are some 
tools that can make it a little easier [6]. Although often very tedious and time consuming, 
going through the source code manually is good option, when the source code of the 
software is available. There are some static code analyzers available to perform this job. 
A static code analyzer helps in identifying security related bugs by looking at the source 
code of  the application, but it does not run the application, nor does it need its binary [6, 
9] (although there are static analyzers that analyze binaries, too [4, 8]). This helps in 
eliminating bugs before the application is built and shipped. There are various static code 
analyzers available, some specialized towards finding one type of vulnerability, some 
specialized towards a particular programming language, and some very generic ones that 
can be used against a wide range of programming languages. But most static code 
analyzers suffer from a high false positive rate [6]. Consequently, some type of human 
intervention is necessary to verify the results of these static checkers. Another concern is 
that some static code checkers expect programmers to add some annotations to the code 
in order to find the vulnerabilities. 
 When source code for an application is not available, finding vulnerabilities 
becomes a harder task. Running the program and entering random inputs and invalid 
inputs, or doing random operations is one type of testing for finding vulnerabilities. But 
this can end up being unfruitful, after a lot of time and effort have been invested [9]. It is 
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possible to not find even single vulnerability after spending many hours on testing.  
 Another way of finding vulnerabilities with binary files is reverse engineering the 
binary, analyzing the assembly code in order to find how things have been implemented 
in the software [24]. Once an overview of the software is obtained, it is a little easier to 
guess some of the weaker points in an application. The authors of [36] provide a very 
good example of how reverse engineering can be used to reframe parts of source code 
and find vulnerabilities in the software. Disassemblers and decompilers are some of the 
tools that are used for reverse engineering. For carrying out reverse engineering, one 
needs to have a thorough idea of the underlying OS and the architecture, since assembly 
instruction can vary widely depending upon the architecture [24]. There are certain tools 
available [4] that can check the disassembled code for some common vulnerability 
patterns and highlight them. Reverse engineering is a huge area, and it is outside of scope 
of this paper. 
4.2 Static Analyzers Types  
Most early versions of static analyzers were written specifically for one language, 
and some were written for specific type of vulnerability. But more recent static analyzers 
are better written and carry support for source code written in various languages. Thus, 
they can detect a huge range or types of vulnerabilities in source code. 
Table 1 provides a list of static analysis tools that are used as a part of this 
research. The intention of the analysis was not to evaluate a product or any of the source 
code analyzers. Each analyzer is good in its own way and performs well for the specific 
reason for which it was written. The main intention was to analyze their false positives, 
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Table 1.  List of Static Analysis Tools. 
Name Language Main Features 
Splint C Finding security vulnerabilities and coding errors.  
Sparse C Was initially built to find coding faults in kernel 
code. 
Flawfinder C/C++ Finding security vulnerabilities in source code. 
Fortify C,C++,Java,.NET, 
PHP,Coldfusion 
Supports numerous languages. Finding huge 
variety of security vulnerabilities in source code. 
Rats C/C++, Perl, PHP, 
Python 
Security auditing tool; identifies dangerous 
function calls. 
 
false negatives, and their time of operation. The tools used as a part of this analysis were 
chosen because they support source code written in C and C++.  
4.3 Experiments  
This section describes the tests that were conducted on the static analyzers and the 
result produced. These test cases were written based on the observations of running some 
of the static analyzers on student code. Manual verification of the static analysis results 
against student assignments revealed some false positives and false negatives with the 
static analyzers, and some of these test cases are based on those results. Table 2 at the end 
of this chapter provides a summary of the result. 
4.3.1 Test for Null Pointer Dereference 
 Null pointer dereference is a potential security issue. It can lead to failure of 
program, DoS or could even be exploited to write into arbitrary memory location [36]. It 
is more commonly found in C/C++ programs compared to other programming languages, 
and it is rated as medium in open web application security project (OWASP).  
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 4.3.1.1 Presence in Commercial/Open Source Programs. The null pointer 
dereferencing problem is pretty common among various software products. It occurs 
either because of missing a null check after a memory allocation function call, such as 
malloc or realloc, or it occurs because of invalid/wrong pointer assignments. A search for 
null pointer dereference in Bugtraq lists problems in various software, including some of 
the more popular ones like Apache, Internet Explorer, Linux Kernel, etc.  
4.3.1.2 Source Code. The source code for the first test case is as follows: 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 4.3.1.3 Problem.  As is clearly seen in the above code, pointer p is allocated some 
space with malloc call, and later p is assigned c's value which does not point to anything. 
In this test case, the null pointer is being tried to dereference. There is also a memory leak 
in this case wherein p is not freed before it is assigned c's value. The following are results 
from various static analyzers that were run on this code. 
Sparse: No defects found. 
Splint: Variable c used before definition; and Memory leak detected; 
Flawfinder: No defects found. 
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RATS: No defects found. 
Fortify: Missing checking against null and memory leak; 
 Neither Sparse, nor Flawfinder, nor RATS found any defects in the code. Splint, 
however, found both the coding mistakes. It reported using c's value before initialization, 
though it did not specify that the problem was a null pointer dereference.  Also, Splint 
detected the memory leak in the code.  
Fortify identified the memory leak problem correctly, but it was not able to track 
down the null pointer dereference problem for this case. The other error it reported was 
missing checking against null, which is probably, in reality, the null pointer dereference 
problem.  Fortify gave this error for the statement p =c, with the comment that p is used 
before it is checked against null. This is probably a false negative because in the 
statement p =c, p is assigned c's value, and p's value (which was originally returned from 
malloc) is not used. 
4.3.2 Test for Taint Flag Propagation and Removal 
 An input to the program from the external world either directly or indirectly is 
considered to be tainted data, and passing tainted data to a sensitive function call like 
system(), setenv() will result in either command injection vulnerability, environment 
manipulation vulnerability, or some other security issue. All static analyzers should track 
tainted data propagation and flag a variable as tainted if it is used to store tainted data. 
Also, it is necessary for the source analyzer to remove the taint flag from the variable if 
the input data in it is overwritten with a constant data. Not updating the taint flag on a 
variable could either result in a false negative or a false positive. 
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 In the sample code below, the input from a user is obtained and stored in a 
variable named “value”. Later, the contents of this are overwritten with constant data. So, 
the taint flag should be removed from the variable, as it is safe to pass this variable to the 
setenv function.  
 The purpose of this test was to first check if the source analyzers assign a taint 
flag to variables that store data from the external world and next to check if that taint flag 
is removed later when the variable is assigned a constant value. 
 4.3.2.1 Presence in Commercial/Open Source Software. The code pattern here, 
i.e., storing external input into a variable and later storing a constant data into the same 
variable, can be found in lot of open source software. It is a way of saving some memory 
by reusing an already declared buffer instead of having some extra space. A regular 
expression search in an open source code search engine revealed at least six projects that 
followed the same pattern. If these codes were to be run over the static analyzers, a lot of 
false positives related to command injection vulnerability or similar ones might be 
produced.  
4.3.2.2 Source Code. The source code for the second test follows:  
1. #include<stdio.h>  
2. #include<string.h>  
3. #include<stdlib.h>  
4. int main()  
5. {  
6. char name[30];  
7. char value[20];  
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8. scanf("%19s",value);  
9. printf("\n%s\n",value);  
10. strncpy(name,"sathya-090-",6);  
11. strcpy(value ,"Hrt");  
12. setenv("myname",value,1);  
13. return 0;  
14. }  
 4.3.2.3 Problem. In the above code, an input is obtained from the user and is 
stored in a char array. The value obtained from the user is directly passed to the setenv() 
function call which manipulates the value of an environment variable. It should be noted 
that the above code was split into two versions, one in which line 11 is commented and 
one in which line 11 is uncommented and is part of the code. When line 11 is 
uncommented the following was found: 
Sparse: No defects found. 
Splint: Return value of scanf is ignored; 
RATS: Warning of usage of scanf 
Flawfinder: 4 Warning of buffer overflow. Flagging the use of static-sized array, 
use of scanf,strcpy,stncpy.  
Fortify: Setting manipulation error on setenv() line 
Sparse did not find any defects with the code. Splint resulted in a warning that 
specified that the return value of scanf was being ignored which probably was not 
relevant to the current test case. RATS resulted in a false positive. It gave a warning of 
the usage of scanf, although scanf is, in fact, being used properly in the above code. 
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Flawfinder gave four false positive results for a buffer overflow error. It gave a warning 
about declaring a static-sized array, using scanf to obtain input into the char array, using 
strcpy, and using of strncpy, although all the functions were used in a safe manner and did 
not affect the security of the source code in any way. So, except for Fortify, all these tools 
produced the same result, irrespective of line 11 being present or commented out in the 
code. 
When the source code with line 11 commented out was run over Fortify, it 
identified passing the user input value directly to setenv as a security vulnerability and 
gave a setting manipulation error. But even after that line was uncommented, Fortify still 
gave the setting manipulation error, which is a false positive. Line 11 is assigning a 
completely new value to the “value” variable which initially had the user input stored in 
it. As a result, passing “value” to setenv is safe usage, since it has the hardcoded value in 
it. Nevertheless, Fortify still gives the setting manipulation error. 
4.3.3 Test for Buffer Overflow, Format String and  
         String Length Update 
 
 The buffer overflow problem has been in existence for a long time, and almost all 
static analyzers are capable of detecting simple buffer overflow vulnerabilities in source 
code. The risk of buffer overflow is rated high. Consequently, it is very important for a 
source analyzer to detect buffer overflow and format string problems in the code. 
 Also, for a static analyzer, it is important to have meta-information about a 
variable declared in the source code. Unfortunately, not all source code analyzers 
maintain meta-information about the variables that are used in the source code. One such 
piece of information that is necessary is the length of the string. It is not always possible 
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to have such information, but wherever constant data is being written into a character 
array, the length of the string should be updated. Having this type of information reduces 
some of the false positives.  
 4.3.3.1 Presence in Commercial /Open Source Software. Various types of software 
have buffer overflow vulnerabilities or format string vulnerabilities. A search for buffer 
overflow in the Bugtraq database listed around 1000+ results, indicating that these 
vulnerabilities are very much in existence. Since buffer overflow has been well handled 
by the new generation source code analyzers, the main intention of this test was actually 
to find if static analyzers catch format string vulnerability and if the source analyzer 
keeps track of string length to the extent possible. Keeping track of the string length 
could reduce a false positive in this test case. 
 In this test code, user input is obtained in str1 at line 7, and a buffer overflow 
problem is found there. However, because str1 is terminated to the appropriate length in 
line 8, the strcpy in line 9 is actually a safe call in this case, since str1 and str2 are 
variables having same buffer size. Hence, if a string length is correctly updated, line 9 
will not be flagged as buffer overflow vulnerability.  
 Using a printf without a format string would probably be noticed in a lot of 
debugging code. Some debugging code is not taken away from the original source code 
prior to release, and this could lead to format string vulnerability. A search in a code 
search engine produced a lot of results related to this problem.  However, not all of these 
could be a format string problem, because the data passed to printf may not be tainted 
data. Nevertheless, a similar pattern is seen in several source codes among which Mozilla 
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internationalization code and the open source version of Broadcom wireless driver are 
notable projects. 
4.3.3.2 Source Code. The source code for the third test follows: 
1. #include<stdio.h>  
2. #include<string.h>  
3. int main()  
4. {  
5. char str1[40], str2[40];  
6. scanf("%43s",str1);  
7. str1[39] = '\0';  
8. strcpy(str2,str1);  
9. sprintf(str2,"%s",str1);  
10. printf(str2);   
11. return 0;  
12. } 
 4.3.3.3 Problem. Two strings str1 and str2 are declared with same size. User input 
at line 6 does not limit the input size to 39; instead, 43 is specified as the input limit, so 
there is a buffer overflow vulnerability in line 6. In line 7, str1 [33] is set to null so that, 
the following two lines are a safe usage of strcpy and sprintf function calls. In Line 10, a 
string in which user input is stored,str2 is directly fed to the printf call without any format 
string specified. This could result in format string vulnerability. Here are the results. 
Sparse: No defects found 
Splint: Return type of scanf ignored, usage of sprintf leads to buffer overflow, 
format string in printf. 
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Flawfinder: 5 warnings. Flagging the usage of scanf, strcpy, sprintf and 
declaration of static size arrays. 
RATS: Fixed size buffer, usage of scanf, strcpy, sprintf and printf without format 
string. 
Fortify: Format string vulnerability and buffer overflow. 
 Although two explicit coding errors were present, Sparse did not flag those 
mistakes. While Flawfinder resulted in many false positives, it flagged the usage o f all 
dangerous functions. These functions could be easily misused, but in this instance they 
were used in a safe way in the above code, with the exception of scanf which introduces 
buffer overflow vulnerability in the above code. Flawfinder did not catch the usage of 
printf, without specifying the format string option. RATS did find the usage of printf 
function which could lead to format string vulnerability.  The other warnings RATS 
produced were just false positives. Fortify caught both the buffer overflow problem and 
the format string vulnerability in the above source code. 
4.3.4 Test for Pointer Reference Update and  
         Memory Leak 
 
 This test code was intended to verify if the source analyzer tracks pointer 
assignment and detects memory leak.  
 4.3.4.1 Presence in Commercial/ Open Source Software. Memory leaks occur due 
to not freeing up memory that was allocated dynamically in the program. Memory leaks 
can lead to denial of service attacks. Memory leaks are present in lot of commercial and 
open source applications, including Microsoft Word, Internet Explorer, and Firefox.  
 In this test code, there is only one memory leak. At line 5, variable b is assigned 
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a's value. If source analyzers keep track of this, it will not flag line 8 as a memory leak 
problem since free(b) is called there, thus releasing the memory which was declared at 
line 4 (since b actually points to a). A very similar code pattern can be observed in lot of 
open source projects, such as Syallable and Diet Libc. 
4.3.4.2 Source Code. 
1. void func_mleak()  
2. {  
3. char *a, *b;  
4. a = malloc(10);  
5. b =a;  
6. a[9] = '1';  
7. a = realloc((void *)a,2);   
8. if(a == NULL) free(b);  
9. }  
10. int main()  
11. {  
12. func_mleak();  
13. return 0;  
14. }  
 4.3.4.3 Problem. This case was written to check if the static analyzers are able to 
determine a memory leak and no null check after malloc problems. In the above code, the 
function fun_mleak() has both the specified problems. Variable 'a' is malloced, and the 
return value is never checked against null before 'a' is de-referenced. Also, there is only 
one case wherein 'a' is being deallocated. When call to realloc fails to allocate memory, 
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the memory allocated initially by malloc calls is deallocated, or if realloc succeeds, the 
memory is not deallocated, hence a memory leak in the program. Here are the results. 
Sparse: No defects except for few false positives 
Splint: Index of possibly null pointer, dead storage b passed to free, storage a not 
released before return 
Flawfinder: No defects found. 
RATS: Warning about usage of realloc on sensitive memory 
Fortify: Two memory leaks, missing check against null, usage of realloc on 
sensitive memory. 
 Sparse did not find any defects with this code, except for a few false positives 
about function declarations. Splint flagged the missing null check against the return value 
of malloc and also found the memory leak flaw in the code. In addition, it had one 
warning related to passing dead storage 'b' to free function call. This is probably a false 
positive, since that statement is executed only when the realloc fails, at which point b will 
have the initial value of 'a'. No luck with Flawfinder, in this case. Fortify had two 
memory leaks in which one memory leak was valid one and the other memory leak was 
flagged at the realloc line, thus it was probably a false positive since the next line checks 
the return value of realloc and calls free if the realloc fails. Fortify also detected the 
missing null check flaw. Other than this, it gave a warning about usage of realloc on 
memory that stored sensitive information.  The same was returned by RATS.  
4.3.5 Test for Taint Propagation Through  
         Stack Referred Variables 
 
 Taint propagation is forwarding the taint flag from one variable to another 
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variable, i.e., when the source variable is tainted, if its value is assigned to any other 
variable, the taint flag must be propagated to the destination variable as well. Propagating 
the taint flag properly between variables reduces the number of false positives and false 
negatives. 
 The main intention of the test code was to check if the source code analyzer 
understands the relative addressing of variables. Instead of addressing a variable directly 
by its name, it is indirectly addressed by using the offset from a different variable in the 
stack.  
 4.3.5.1 Presence in Commercial/Open Source Project. The code pattern followed 
here (referring to a variable by its offset from a different variable in stack) is a common 
practice in C, C++ programs.  This type of code is seen in a lot of open source projects, 
including big projects like PHP, Perl, FFMPEG, etc. 
4.3.5.2 Source Code. Below is this source code for this test: 
1. int main()  
2. {  
3. char a[20];  
4. char b[20] = "ls";  
5. scanf("%19s",a);  
6. strcpy(b,b+20);   
7. printf("%s\n",b);  
8. setenv("PATH","/usr/local/bin",1);  
9. system(b);  
10. return 0;  
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11. } 
 4.3.5.3 Problem. This program has command injection vulnerability. User input is 
obtained and is stored in variable ‘a’. Then strncpy function is used to copy the contents 
of ‘a’ into variable ‘b’. Note that the strncpy function call does not take the source as 
variable ‘a’ explicitly, rather it specifies b+20 which is the location of the first byte of ‘a’. 
It was written in this way so as to learn if the static analyzer really follows what is 
happening in the program. Later, after copying the value of ‘a’ into ‘b’, the PATH 
variable is set, and the system function is called with ‘b’ as its parameter.  However, this 
program was also tested with parameter ‘a’ going directly into system() function call. 
Sparse: No Defects found. 
Splint: Return value of scanf ignored , unrecognized identifier setenv, return value 
system ignored. 
Flawfinder: Usage of static sized buffer, usage of scanf, strncpy on static-sized 
buffer, usage of system() could be dangerous 
Rats: Warnings about usage of fixed size buffer, scanf, and system() function calls 
Fortify: Warning about command injection, unchecked return value of system() 
Sparse did not find any defects with this code. Flawfinder, RATS, and Splint gave 
similar warnings related to the usage of the static size buffer, usage of scanf, and strncpy 
function calls, as well as ignoring the return value of the system function call. None of 
these programs were able to trace that variable ‘b’ holds the value of variable ‘a’ which is 
nothing but the user input. 
However, the program was modified to make the system call directly take variable 
‘a’ as its argument. Even after changing the argument to ‘a’, except for Fortify, none of 
55 
 
 
the tools was able to trace the input data path. The rest of the static analyzers produced 
the same result. Further, Sparse did not find any defects, even though the command 
injection was very explicit in the program. Fortify noticed that the input variable was 
directly sent to the system() function, flagged that line as a high command injection 
vulnerability, and showed a small trace of how user input reached the system function() 
call. 
4.3.6 Test for Integer Overflow  
 The purpose of this test code was to verify whether the static analyzers detect 
integer overflow problems. Integer overflow can lead to denial of service attacks. While 
integer overflow problems can be easily overlooked, detecting them could save 
developers considerable time and debugging effort in the long run. 
 4.3.6.1 Presence in Commercial /Open Source Projects. Integer overflow 
problems are widespread across both commercial and open source applications.  GIMP 
and Internet Explorer are some of the popular applications found to have integer overflow 
vulnerabilities. 
4.3.6.2 Source Code. The source code for this test follows: 
1. int main(int argc, char *argv[])  
2. {   
3. int a, i ;  
4. long long b;  
5. scanf("%lld",&b);  
6. a = b;  
7. for(i=0;i>a;i++)  
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8. {  
9. //does some busy operations...  
10. }  
11. return 0;  
12. } 
 4.3.6.3 Problem. This program has an integer overflow problem that could lead to 
a denial of service attack. A long long variable which is generally double the size of an int 
is used to get some input from the user. In the later part of the program, this long long 
value is copied into an integer variable. This assignment can cause the integer variable to 
overflow. Later in the program, there is a loop wherein variable ‘i’ runs from 0 to the 
value of ‘a’ (which is negative due to overflow) and assumes that the loop does some 
heavy operations. Now, if the value of 'a' turns out negative, the loop will run for a very 
long time and can potentially lead to a denial of service attack. Here are the results: 
Sparse: No defects found 
Splint: Assignment of long long to int variable, return value of scanf ignored. 
Flawfinder: No defects found 
RATS: No defects found. 
Fortify: No Defects found. 
Except for Splint, no tool was able to find anything wrong with the code. Splint 
gave a warning about the assignment of long long to int type.  
4.3.7 Test for Indirect User Data Assignment to Variable 
 This test code was adopted from a strategy in [21]. The intent was to see if static 
analyzers understand the logic of the source code. Although it is very difficult for static 
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analyzers to detect program logic, doing so helps them reduce false positives by a huge 
factor. 
 4.3.7.1 Presence in Commercial /Open Source Application.  As mentioned earlier, 
this test code idea is purely adopted from a research paper and does not correspond to any 
particular vulnerabilities or pattern that could be observed or searched for in any 
commercial or open source applications. 
 4.3.7.2 Source Code. The source code for this problem follows: 
1. int main()  
2. { 
3. char a[10], b[10];  
4. int i ='a', j =0;  
5. scanf("%9s",a);  
6. for( j = 0; j <strlen(a);j++){  
7. for( i = 97 ;i< 122; i++)   
8. {  
9. if(a[j] ==  i)  
10. {  
11. b[j] =  i;  
12. break;  
13. }  
14. }  
15. }  
16. b[j] = '\0';  
17. printf("%s\n",b);  
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18. system(b);  
19. return 0;  
20. } 
 4.3.7.3 Problem. This program has command injection vulnerabilities, but the 
main intention of this program was not to see whether static analyzers are able to detect 
the command injection vulnerability.  Input obtained from the user is stored in variable ‘a’ 
and is copied to ‘b’ by comparing each and every character against all the ASCII values. 
The ascidia values are copied to the destination string. Certainly no program will have a 
function, similar to this, for copying one string to another; this was merely written to see 
if static analyzers follow the code. 
Sparse: No defects found. 
Splint: No defects found. 
Flawfinder: No defects found. 
Rats: No Defects found. 
Fortify: A warning about command injection vulnerability. 
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 Table 2. Results of Running Test Code over Various Static Analyzers. 
Test Case Sparse Splint Flawfinder Rats Fortify 
Test for Null Pointer Dereference F - F - F - F - F - 
Test for Taint Flag propagation and 
Removal 
F - F + F + F + F + 
Test for Buffer Overflow, Format String and 
String length update 
F - F + F + F + N.F.R 
Test for Pointer Reference Update and 
Memory Leak 
F - F + F - F + F + 
Test for Taint Propagation through Stack 
Referred Variables 
F - F - F - F - F - 
Test for Integer Overflow F - N.F.R F - F - F - 
Test for Indirect User Data assignment to 
Variable 
F - F - F - F - F - 
F - = False Negative, F + = False Positive, N.F.R = No False Result 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
FALSE RESULTS RESOLUTION 
 
5.1 Introduction  
The current set of static analyzers has both false positive and false negative 
problems. Each of the static analyzers either misses vulnerability or flags a proper or 
valid statement as a security bug. Sure, it takes a long time to completely eliminate false 
positive and false negative problems -- assuming it is even possible to do so. However, it 
would be highly beneficial to lower the number of false positives and false negatives. 
This chapter presents techniques developed to lower the number of false results by static 
analyzers.   
The results of a vulnerability scan of various source files revealed various 
problems in the current set of static analyzers. To overcome this set of problems, a set of 
logical rules/statements was written. The initial plan was to convert these logical rules 
into a set of rule packs for a static analyzer. These rule packs are similar to a plug-in for 
software. These rules sets were written in XML with a proper syntax so that software 
analyzers recognize the format and can perform some extra operations based on the 
specifications written inside the XML file. This helps the static analyzer to more 
efficiently detect problems and reduces the number of false positives. The following are 
the set of logics or rules that were designed to overcome the false positive/negative 
problems.  
Fortify, a static analyzer was the initial target since it has options for writing 
customized rule sets, including those that detect additional types of vulnerabilities or 
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discard a particular type of vulnerability. Also, the Fortify software analyzer has an 
inbuilt custom rule set generator that guides the developer in creating rule sets. In fact, 
Fortify provides documentation on how to write custom rule sets. The custom rule set 
generator is designed to generate rules that are customized to a specific project rather 
than a generic rule set. For example, one can specify the function within the program that 
data from the external world enters, which function is going to use this input, and other 
similar things.   
Unfortunately, the documentation is not complete. For example, there is no 
documentation on how to remove taint flags from the variables, there is no list of the 
different type of taint flags that are used by the program, one is unable to ascertain if 
variables are dynamically allocated, etc. Thus, while Fortify has access to this type of 
information, sparse documentation exists, hence restricting access to these data for use by 
third party developers.   
 Because of Fortify’s lack of documentation, in order to implement the logic for 
scanning and finding the vulnerabilities in the source code, it was necessary to write a 
custom tokenizer and parser for a language. Sure, rewriting the parser and tokenizer was 
not a good option to start with, as, other software exists that already includes a parser and 
does a great job of parsing source code.  For example GCC Frontend includes a great 
parser for many languages, but the problem comes in adopting the source code to the 
custom-built source analyzer project in order to perform all the required tasks. One needs 
a deep understanding of the GCC source code or the source code of other software for 
modification, recompiling with all the dependencies, and making it work. Such a process 
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can take a tremendous amount of work and time. Hence, a custom-built tokenizer and 
parser were written in order to perform the job that was required for this project. The 
following section provides a little information about the design and implementation of the 
tokenizer and parser for the C language, the logical rules that were written to overcome 
the problems, and how these logics were implemented and tested with the source code. 
5.2 Design 
 Figure 13 shows the steps involved in analyzing the source code. First, the source 
code is given to the tokenizer which splits up the program into tokens. Next, the parser 
takes these tokens, validates them, and passes them to the analyzer which checks for 
security issues and outputs the result to the user. To know more about the member 
variables and the member functions of each and every class presented here, refer to 
Appendix B. 
5.2.1 Package - Lexical Analyzer 
  This package has a tokenizer implementation. The tokenizer reads the source code 
character-by-character and forms appropriate tokens. It tokenizes the whole source code 
file and provides these tokens to the parser. This package, lexical analyzer has the 
following interface/classes inside it.  
 5.2.1.1 Interface Tokenizer.  This interface specifies the necessary methods that 
need to be implemented for a valid tokenizer. A tokenizer should be specific to a 
programming language, and it needs the grammar file for that language to be in a 
particular format. Please refer to Appendix A for more details on this. 
5.2.1.2 Class Token. This class defines the member variables for a token.  
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Figure 13. Design of static analyzer. 
Token types are pretty generic with respect to programming languages [37].  For 
example, each programming language might have a different set of keywords.  
Nevertheless, they belong to same token type/category, namely, KEYWORDS [37].  
 5.2.1.3 Class - CTokenizer. This is the tokenizer for the C programming language. 
This class implements the tokenizer interface. The grammar file for the C programming 
language was adopted from a YACC grammar file written by Lee in 1985 [38, 39]. This 
grammar file was modified in order to get it to work with this tokenizer implementation.  
5.2.2 Package - ProgramElements  
This package contains the classes that represent the basic elements of a program. 
The approach in structuring a program is shown in Figure 14, and this package contains 
all the classes discussed in the subsections below.  
 5.2.2.1 Class Class. Classes form the topmost layer in the program hierarchy. Any 
C program is considered to have only one class, the “MAIN” class. Other than that, there 
are no other classes involved in a C program. 
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Figure 14. Structuring of a program. 
 5.2.2.2 Class Function. This class is going to maintain meta-information about 
any function that is declared inside the source code. This class has two main members, 
blocks and a variable stack. A block has variables inside it. The variable stack is updated 
whenever a variable declaration statement is found in the function. 
 5.2.2.3 Class Variable. This class has a huge number of member variables inside 
it.  This class maintains a lot of information about each and every variable declared in the 
program source code.  Whenever a new variable is declared in a program source, a new 
variable object is created, is added to the function in which it was declared, and is stored 
under the appropriate block. Initially, the size of the variable is just hardcoded inside the 
constructor. The size is set to 1, 4, or 8 based on the type of string. But the variable could 
be changed easily just by having a configuration file that contains these data. There are 
variables to keep track of array size and also malloc size of a variable.  The array size is 
updated if the variable is declared as a static array, and the malloc size is updated if the 
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variable is declared as pointer or if it is later assigned a return value of malloc function 
call. This class has a string variable named ‘pointsto’ which is used to keep track of 
whether the variable points to a null location, malloc, realloc, or another variable.  There 
is a variable named ‘flag’ which helps in maintaining the taint flags and source of taint 
information, i.e., whether is it from user input, a file, or from an environment variable, 
etc. Figures 15 and 16 illustrate the class design of the package lexical analyzer and the 
package program elements, respectively. Refer to Appendix B to know more about what 
type of metadata are maintained for variable and how it is used for identifying the 
problems. 
 5.2.3 Package Parser  
 This package contains only one class CParser. Initially, the parser is implemented 
for the C language and has minimal internal functions.  It was mainly written just to 
implement and test the logic or the rules. Hence, it cannot be used with any C file. It 
works for all the source code discussed in Section 4.3, but it is not expected to work with 
any other source code. Also, this class assumes that the program is syntactically correct, 
i.e., it is compilable with a standard C compiler.  
5.3 Logic and Implementation 
5.3.1 Test for Null Pointer Dereference  
Refer to Section 4.3.1 for details about this test case and the source code used for 
testing the static analysis tools.  
5.3.1.1 Logic.  
 Before being used, the pointer variable should be malloced or assigned a constant  
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Figure 15. Class design of package lexical analyzer. 
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 
Figure 16. Class design of package program elements. 
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memory location.  
 If the pointer is assigned another variable in rhs, the variable should be malloced  
 or should be assigned to a constant (memory location). 
5.3.1.2 Implementation. To implement this logic, the CParser class has two 
different functions, one to handle the variable declaration statements and the other to 
handle the assignment statements. In this case, the pointer ‘p’ is declared first. Next, the 
declaration statement handler inside the CParser creates a new variable object and adds it 
to the function. Then, at line 6, variable ‘p’ is assigned to the return value of the malloc 
function call ((int *) malloc (4)). Once this statement is parsed, the assignment statement 
handler updates the pointer variable's (p) mallocsize to 4. At line 5, ‘p’ is assigned to 
variable ‘c’. The assignment handler now checks if the rhs of the assignment statement is 
a variable or a constant. Since it is a variable, the assignment handler checks if ‘c’ has 
been malloced and to where c is pointing (mallocsize and pointsto are member variables 
of the class ‘Variable’). Since neither of them is assigned, the CParser throws an error 
saying variable c is not initialized. Now, at the next statement *p = 100;, the assignment 
handler checks the malloc size of variable ‘p’, and it throws an error that ‘p’ might point 
to null, which could end up in a segmentation fault.  
5.3.1.3 Result.  
WARNING : Variable c might not be initialized or checked 
against NULL  
ERROR - THIS VARIABLE (var name=p) WAS MALLOCED AND NOW 
REFERENCE IS BEING CHANGED, THIS WILL LEAD TO MEMORY LEAK  
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ERROR - Var p might point to NULL , line no =8  
5.3.2 Test for Taint Flag Propagation and Removal 
 Refer to Section 4.3.2 for details about this test case and the source code that was 
used for testing the static analysis tools. 
 5.3.2.1 Logic. During an assignment statement, a string copy function, or any 
other equivalent function, if the source is a constant or if the source variable is not 
tainted, the taint flag (if any) should be removed from the destination variable.  
 Pseudo rule:   
 <DataflowRule>  
  <Function name = strcpy>  
  if <TaintFlagCheck(source) == false> OR < Source == CONSTANT>  
  then <TaintFlagRemove(DestinationVariable)>  
 </DataflowRule>  
 Since there was not much documentation on how to retrieve the taint flag of a 
variable nor on getting the parameters of function, it was difficult to implement 
this dataflow rule in Fortify.  
 5.3.2.2 Implementation. A function handler was written to implement this logic. In 
the current version of the CParser class, the function prototype and format of some of the 
standard functions are hardcoded. For example, the function handler goes through an if-
else loop and compares the function name found in source code against a set of strings to 
identify the function call. If it is the scanf function call, the function handler retrieves the 
format string and identifies the variable where input is stored. Also, the function handler 
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adds a taint flag to the variables whose values are obtained from user.  The scanf at line 
13 receives input from the user and stores it in the variable “value”. Later, at line 16, the 
user input is overwritten by a constant value. The function handler checks to see the 
source parameter of strcpy and whether it is a constant or a variable. Since in this case it 
is a constant, the function handler removes the taint flag from the destination variable 
(the variable “value”, in this case). Now, if the value is used in the setenv function, it 
should be completely safe as the variable is no more tainted. Hence, the function handler 
checks if the parameters of setenv are tainted. If they are, the function handler raises an 
error; otherwise, it does not.  
5.3.2.3 Result. 
With Line 11 commented:  
ERROR Variable name = value seems to be tainted, flag = 1  
 
With Line 11 Uncommented:  
Strcpy detected  
Removing Taint Flag on variable value  
5.3.3 Test for Buffer Overflow, Format String, and  
        String Length Update  
 
 Refer to Section 4.3.3 for details about this test case and the source code that was 
used for testing the static analysis tools. 
5.3.3.1 Logic. 
 The main logic is to keep track of the length of the string (char array).  
 A null character appended to the char array is a signal to update the length of the 
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string to the index wherein null was stored.  
 5.3.3.2 Implementation. This test has logic pretty similar to the previous one. 
There are two interesting things in the source code.  First, there is a buffer overflow in the 
scanf function call at line 7. Some of the source code analyzers did not identify this 
vulnerability. But the custom parser that was written for this project identified this buffer 
overflow error. The next line appends a string terminator symbol to the appropriate 
position in order to mark the end of string. At line 9, the strcpy copies string 1 in to string 
2. So now logically, string 1 and string 2 should be tainted. But no buffer overflow 
problem with string 2 exists, since string 1 is now terminated at the right index. However, 
assume a case wherein line 8 is commented out, i.e., string 1 is not appended with a null 
character. Now, copying string 1 to string 2 should result in a buffer overflow condition.  
This problem was not detected by most of the source code analyzers, but the 
custom parser identified this error and reported it.  Detection is done by having a ‘length’ 
member variable inside the variable class. This length is updated based on scanf or a null 
char assignment. If the length of the source string is greater than the array size of the 
destination variable, the parser detects the buffer overflow error.  
The second flaw in this code is the format string vulnerability at line 11.  Since 
string 2 is tainted, passing it directly to printf results in format string vulnerability. The 
function handler inside CParser checks if the parameter 0 to printf is a variable or a 
constant. If it is a variable and if the variable is tainted, the function handler raises format 
string error.  
5.3.3.3 Result. 
(With line no 8 uncommented)  
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DETECTED BUFFER OVERFLOW in line 7  
ERROR ARRAY INDEX > ARRAY SIZE .. BUFFER OVER FLOW,  Line 
NUmber =7  
PRINTF FUNCTION CALL  
ERROR- LOOKS LIKE VARIABLE str2 IS TAINTED AND PASSING IT 
INTO PRINTF() WITHOUT FORMAT STRING COULD LEAD TO FORMAT 
STRING VULNERABILITY  
(With line no 8 commented out.)  
DETECTED BUFFER OVERFLOW in line 7  
ERROR ARRAY INDEX > ARRAY SIZE .. BUFFER OVER FLOW,  Line 
NUmber =7  
Strcpy detected   
ERROR Source Variable length is > dest variable size in line 
=9  
SPRINTF detected  
ERROR Source Variable length is > dest variable size in line 
=10  
PRINTF FUNCTION CALL  
ERROR- LOOKS LIKE VARIABLE str2 IS TAINTED AND PASSING IT 
INTO PRINTF() WITHOUT FORMAT STRING COULD LEAD TO FORMAT 
STRING VULNERABILITY  
5.3.4 Test for Pointer Reference Update and Memory Leak 
 Refer to Section 4.3.4 to know more about this test case and the source code that 
was used for testing the static analysis tools. 
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5.3.4.1 Logic. 
 The static analyzer should keep track of aliases to some level.  
  Pseduo rule:  
   <ControlflowRule>     
  Variable f;  
  State start,allocated,safe,leak  
    start->allocated { f = alloc(...)}  
  allocated->safe { return(f) | free(f) | free(alias(f)) | ifblock(f,null,true) }  
  allocated->leak {end_scope(f)}  
   </ControlflowRule>  
 5.3.4.2 Implementation.  This logic has to deal with memory leaks. The main 
thing is to keep track of aliases. In the source code at line 5, variable ‘a’ is copied into 
variable ‘b’.  While parsing the statement, variable ‘b’ is updated with the value of ‘a’, 
and the pointsto variable of ‘b’ is set to ‘a’. Now, ‘b’ points to ‘a’. In line 8, free (b) is 
called if ‘a’ is null. So, if the realloc function call fails, variable ‘a’ is released. Thus, 
logically there is no memory leak if ‘a’ is null. Because ‘b’ points to variable ‘a’, ‘a’ is 
freed in that statement. The function handler takes care of this. Hence, another false 
positive is reduced by the proposed logic.  
5.3.4.3 Result. 
(With line 8 commented out)  
End of function func_mleak  
This function had 2 variables  
Analyzing variable a  
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MEMORY LEAK DETECTED . Variable name=a  
Analyzing variable b  
(With line 8 uncommented)  
free(b);  
varname = b is being freed  
varname = a is being freed  
(It recognized that variable b points to a in this case and 
frees up variable a and thus reducing a false positive.) 
5.3.5 Test for Taint Propagation Through  
        Stack Referred Variables 
 
 Refer to Section 4.3.5 to know more about this test case and the source code that 
was used for testing the static analysis tools. 
5.3.5.1 Logic.  
 The main concept here is to track the variable based on its relative position in the 
stack.  
 A variable can be addressed by its name directly, or it can be addressed by its 
position in stack.  
 It is important to construct a virtual stack while going through the source code 
[40]. When a variable is addressed by its relative position, the virtual stack should 
be checked to see which variable is actually referred to it. This will help in 
detecting more problems in program source code.  
 5.3.5.2 Implementation. The solution for this test case cannot be obtained by 
writing a rule file for the source code analyzer. The source code analyzer should maintain 
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a stack that mimics the program's stack when it is run. This was implemented in the 
CParser. The class Function has a stack object in it.  So, whenever a variable is added to a 
function, it is pushed onto the stack. In line 7 of the source code, strcpy copies the value 
from b+20 into ‘b’. b+20 is nothing but variable ‘a’. This information can be obtained 
only if the source analyzer builds a pseudo stack. Hence, the CParser class identifies that 
b+20 is nothing but variable ‘a’. And since variable ‘a’ is tainted, the taint flag is now 
forwarded to variable ‘b’.  So, at line 9 when variable ‘b’ is infused into the system’s 
method, the parser throws a tainted variable in System () function call error.  
5.3.5.3 Result. 
Expression b + 20 at line = 6, actually points to variable 
a. 
SYSTEM FUNCTION CALL -  
ERROR- LOOKS LIKE VARIABLE b IS TAINTED AND PASSING IT INTO 
SYSTEM () COULD LEAD TO COMMAND INJECTION VULNERABILITY  
5.3.6 Test for Integer Overflow 
 Refer to Section 4.3.6 for details more about this test case and the source code that 
was used for testing the static analysis tools. 
5.3.6.1 Logic. Copying data from a variable of bigger size to a variable of lower 
size will result in an integer overflow or misinterpretation of data.  
 5.3.6.2 Implementation. There is an integer overflow problem here.  Long long 
variable ‘b’ stores user input that is copied into variable ‘a’. Consequently, variable ‘a’ is 
loaded with a value that is more than what variable ‘a’ can store. The variable class has a 
variable named ‘size’ inside it. The value of this variable depends on the data type of the 
76 
 
 
variable. So, having a destination size less than the source size prompts an overflow error.   
5.3.6.3 Result. 
Var source = b dest = a  
OVERFLOW: DATA SIZE OF DATATYPE long long IS > DATATYPE int  
Table 3 shows the result of running various static analyzers over the test source 
code.  As one can see, the custom parser that was written for this project detects the 
vulnerabilities in the entire test source code, whereas the other static analyzers were not 
able to find the problems present in the source code.  This proves that implementing the 
above discussed logic in other static analyzers will improve their efficiency, thus making 
for better static source code analysis. The accuracy in detecting these errors is limited by 
the functionality of the parser that implements these logics. If the parser extracts all 
necessary information from the source code and updates the metadata of the variable then 
there won’t be any place for false results. Since our custom parser has various limitations 
such as it cannot preprocess header file, does not handle macros, cannot handle variables 
that are extern or static etc., the accuracy is limited to finding vulnerabilities in a source 
code written inside a single source file. Although implementing these logics in an 
advanced parser could yield better results. 
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Table 3. Comparison of Our Source Analyzer with Other Tools. 
Test Case Our Source 
Analyzer 
Sparse Splint Flawfinder Rats Fortify 
Test for Null Pointer Dereference       
Test for Taint Flag propagation 
and Removal 
      
Test for Buffer Overflow, Format 
String and String length update 
      
Test for Pointer Reference 
Update and Memory Leak 
      
Test for Taint Propagation 
through Stack Referred Variables 
      
Test for Integer Overflow       
Test for Indirect User Data 
assignment 
      
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CHAPTER 6 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
6.1 Summary  
 Initially, a study on software vulnerabilities was carried out. Why various types of 
vulnerabilities occur and how can they be exploited are discussed in the thesis. A 
literature survey of current list of static analysis tools was done. A list of static analysis 
tools and a brief description about these tools are listed in Chapter 2. This survey 
discusses various tools and how these static analysis tools have grown over the years. 
Most first generation static analysis tools were geared towards a particular language, but 
new, or second generation, static analysis tools tend to be geared towards more than one 
programming language. They support various languages and are able to detect a wider 
range of vulnerabilities. 
 Analysis on various types of source code was performed. Students’ code from 
each undergraduate level was analyzed, and the results were shown. The analysis and 
results are novel contribution as this type of research on student’s assignment has not 
been done.  It is clear from the analysis results that students are not very aware of secure 
coding concepts and are not worried about the vulnerabilities present in their coding 
assignments. The results also show how programming languages can help in reducing the 
number of vulnerabilities in software. A survey on security-related courses offered in 
various universities was performed. The topics covered in the security courses of 
different universities were analyzed, and the common topics among several security 
courses are discussed in this thesis. Offering these types of security courses will, improve 
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students’ knowledge of security vulnerabilities. Analysis on student code and identifying 
the course list from various universities was one of the major contributions of this thesis. 
 The next analysis was performed on the source code posted on a popular open 
technical interview forum. The main idea behind this analysis was to find out to what 
extent students who are ready to join a company are aware of security issues related to 
programming.  Although there were not many source codes posted in the forum, around 
20% of the ones that were posted had vulnerabilities in them. Although 20% seems low, 
the fact that these source codes were not big enough to have much vulnerability should 
also be considered. Again analysis of source code present in tech interview forums and 
trying evaluate student’s perspective of security is something which is has not been 
worked on previously. 
 The analysis on open source code and the Buqtraq database demonstrates that 
even open source software suffers from a lot of vulnerabilities. From the Bugtraq 
database, it is clear that there is not much difference between the number of 
vulnerabilities reported on commercial applications and the number of vulnerabilities 
reported on open source software. It is necessary for organizations to have policies that 
ensure that the code they borrow is safe and can be used without any problem (with 
respect to security) as a part of their existing code. Some of these policies for borrowing 
code from open source are discussed in the thesis. These are a very generic set of policies 
or steps, and implementing them might differ from one organization to the other. 
 Based results of the various above mentioned analyses, test cases were written 
that could expose the false positives and false negatives of common static analysis tools. 
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Running these test source codes over various tools revealed some of their false positives 
and false negatives, and the result of these tests are shown in the thesis. 
 To lower the rate false positives and false negatives of the static analysis tools, 
some rules/logic were designed. When implemented, these logical rule sets will lower 
false rates of most static analyzers. To test the logic, it was necessary to write a custom 
tokenizer and parser for C programs. Although the custom parser is not very generic and 
was not a great contribution to the parser world, it served the purposes of this project 
well.  It did parse the test code and validated the rules/logic that was framed for reducing 
the false rate. Additionally, this parser could be used for validating such rules written in 
the future.  Running the test cases over the static analysis tool that was written for this 
thesis proved that the designed logic were correct and had far fewer false positives and 
false negatives compared to the other tools. A project in this area would have been more 
like implementing the existing logic, or bringing in support for a new language for an 
existing source analyzer etc., but framing new logic or rule sets to improve the efficiency 
of the static analyzers is another novel contribution of this thesis. 
Contributions:  
 Student code Analysis. Identifying problems in student’s assignments. 
 Assessment of open source code. 
 Identified problems in static analysis tools by using appropriate test cases. 
 Framed rulesets for false result resolution. 
 Implemented and validated the rule set using the custom source analyzer. 
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6.2 Future Work 
 This thesis opens up a lot of opportunities for future work. The student code 
analysis section especially has a lot of scope for further research. Since there has not been 
much research done on this area, it is a good one to explore. The student code analysis 
that was performed as a part of this research is constrained to the assignments that belong 
to one particular university and department (the Computer Science Department at Utah 
State University). It would be interesting to study the vulnerabilities patterns in student 
assignments from other universities. In particular, analyzing assignments from 
universities wherein secure coding is already taught to see how effective these courses are 
would be worthwhile. Further, a comparison of students’ perspective of security from one 
university to the other would be interesting. 
 Analyzing the assignments obtained from various universities and comparing 
them would show which university has better results. Courses from the university with 
the best results could potentially serve as a model for other universities.  
 The interview forum that was analyzed in this thesis was just one of many. 
Possibly, the analysis could be extended to other similar forums to find out more about 
the vulnerabilities in source code found in those forums. Also, it would be an interesting 
option to collaborate with the domain administrators of these forums to learn the 
geographical location of the author, and find out more about the schools present in those 
regions to analyze the vulnerabilities pattern made by people of a particular region or 
belonging to schools from a particular region. 
 The policy for borrowing code from the open source community described in this 
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thesis is a very generic one. Further research can be done in this area to learn more about 
organizations that borrow a lot of code from open sources; a literature survey of policies 
used in these organizations for adopting code from open source could be taken. Such an 
undertaking would certainly help small organizations get an idea of the processes 
followed in bigger organizations, which would help them in safely borrowing code from 
the open source community. 
 The simple static analyzer that was written in order to validate the logic is very 
closely coupled to the test source code that was written. Further development of the 
current tool in order to learn various other vulnerabilities and extending the parser to 
parse several other languages is a whole new exciting area and has a lot potential for 
future work. 
6.3 Conclusion 
 Software security is a very important area to concentrate on no matter what 
product a company is developing. A small vulnerability could end up in a huge loss to the 
company. Organizations should definitely have some secure coding standards and 
training programs that help employees understand the importance of secure coding and 
provide ongoing training for good practices. Further, if secure coding courses were 
offered at every university, students would get good exposure to security concepts, thus 
improving their software development skills. Also, static analyzers should be integrated 
with compilers so that static analysis becomes a standard part of the software build 
process rather than a separate process in the software development life cycle. This would 
definitely improve software security standards across the board. 
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 The source analyzer that was written for this project was able to identify various 
problems found in the sample source codes that were used as test cases for various other 
source analyzers. Implementing the logic discussed above will definitely help current 
source analyzers to reduce their number of false positives and false negatives, thereby 
ensuring better code quality. Such a source analyzer can improve software quality by 
reducing the number of bugs. Its lower false positive and false negative rates will 
potentially draw more people towards using source analyzers, as high false positive and 
false negative rates are the main drawbacks of using source analyzers.  
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APPENDIX A 
CGrammar.txt 
The following are the contents of grammar file that was used with the custom tokenizer 
program.  
#KEYWORDS 
"auto" 
"break" 
"case" 
"char" 
"char*" 
"const" 
"continue" 
"default" 
"do" 
"double" 
"double*" 
"else" 
"enum" 
"extern" 
"float" 
"float*" 
"for" 
"goto" 
"if" 
"int" 
"int*" 
"long" 
"long*" 
"register" 
"return" 
"short" 
"short*" 
"signed" 
"sizeof" 
"static" 
"struct" 
"struct* 
"switch" 
"typedef" 
"union" 
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"unsigned" 
"void" 
"void*" 
"volatile" 
"while" 
 
#OPERATORS 
">>=" 
"<<=" 
"+=" 
"-=" 
"*=" 
"/=" 
"%=" 
"&=" 
"^=" 
"|=" 
">>" 
"<<" 
"++" 
"--" 
"->" 
"&&" 
"||" 
"<=" 
">=" 
"==" 
"!=" 
"=" 
"&" 
"!" 
"~" 
"-" 
"+" 
"*" 
"/" 
"%" 
"<" 
">" 
"^" 
"|" 
"?" 
 
#BRACKETS 
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"{" 
"}" 
"(" 
")" 
"[" 
"]" 
 
#PUNCTUATIONS 
";" 
"," 
":" 
"." 
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APPENDIX B 
 
JAVA DOC : 


java.lang.Object 
  LexicalAnalyzer.LexicalAnalyzer 
 
public class LexicalAnalyzer 
extends java.lang.Object 
Lexical Analyzer is the broker between the parser and the tokenizer.. The parser 
constructs the lexical analyzer object with the language as a parameter The lexical 
analyzer will construct a new Tokenizer object thats specific to the particular object  
 
Constructor Summary 
 (java.lang.String Language)  
          Constructor for Lexical Analyzer.  
java.lang.String Language, java.lang.String grammarfile)  
          A constructor that takes in two parameters, first param specifies the language and 
the second one is the grammar file which contains the grammar for the specified 
language. 
 
  
  
Method Summary 
 Tokenizer getTokenizer()  
          Returns the tokenizer object 
   
Methods inherited from class java.lang.Object 
clone, equals, finalize, getClass, hashCode, notify, notifyAll, 
toString, wait, wait, wait 
   
Constructor Detail 

public LexicalAnalyzer(java.lang.String Language) 
Constructor for Lexical Analyzer. You need to specifiy the language for the 
toknizer instance.. The language can be C, CPP, JAVA , ...... But right now I have 
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tokenizer only for the C language.  
 

public LexicalAnalyzer(java.lang.String Language, 
                       java.lang.String grammarfile) 
A constructor that takes in two parameters, first param specifies the language and 
the second one is the grammar file which contains the grammar for the specified 
language. It has to be a txt file. Please refer to cgrammar.txt in the project folder 
to understand how a grammar file should look like  
Method Detail 

public Tokenizer getTokenizer() 
Returns the tokenizer object  



All Known Implementing Classes:  
CTokenizer 
 
public interface Tokenizer 
Interface Tokenizer should contains prototypes of functions that should be implemented 
by any specific Language tokenizer.  
 
Method Summary 
 Token getNextToken()  
          Should provide the caller with next available token 
 int openGrammarFile()  
          This Function should open the GrammarFile. 
 int openSourceCode(java.lang.String sourcecodefilename)  
          Open the source code for reading... 
 int scanGrammarFile()  
          Should scan the grammar file and populate the data structures 
  
 
  
Method Detail 
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
int openGrammarFile() 
This Function should open the GrammarFile. Should return 0 on success on 1 on 
failure  
 

int scanGrammarFile() 
Should scan the grammar file and populate the data structures  
 

int openSourceCode(java.lang.String sourcecodefilename) 
Open the source code for reading...  
Parameters: 
sourcecodefilename - Filename of the source code 
 

Token getNextToken() 
Should provide the caller with next available token  
 


java.lang.Object 
  LexicalAnalyzer.CTokenizer 
All Implemented Interfaces:  
Tokenizer 
 
public class CTokenizer 
extends java.lang.Object 
implements Tokenizer 
This is tokenizer for C program. This class implements Tokenizer interface.  
 
Field Summary 
 java.util.logging.Logger CtokenLogger  
            
   
Constructor Summary 
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CTokenizer()  
          Constructor  
CTokenizer(java.lang.String GrammarFile)  
          constructor with a grammar file specified in the parameter  
   
Method Summary 
 Token getNextToken()  
          This function should return the next token from the source code it scans 
the source code and finds the next token from the code and returns it 
 int openGrammarFile()  
          This function opens the grammar file and sets the appropriate flags 
 int openSourceCode(java.lang.String sourcecodefilename)  
          This function opens the source code and sets up the buffered reader... 
 int scanGrammarFile()  
          This function will scan the grammar file and populate the corresponding 
Data Structures Keywords, Operators, Punctuation, Brackets 
   
Methods inherited from class java.lang.Object 
clone, equals, finalize, getClass, hashCode, notify, notifyAll, 
toString, wait, wait, wait 
   
Field Detail 

public java.util.logging.Logger CtokenLogger 
 
Constructor Detail 

public CTokenizer() 
Constructor  
 

public CTokenizer(java.lang.String GrammarFile) 
constructor with a grammar file specified in the parameter  
 
Method Detail 
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
public int openGrammarFile() 
This function opens the grammar file and sets the appropriate flags  
Specified by: 
openGrammarFile in interface Tokenizer 
Returns: 
Returns 0 on success , -1 otherwise 
 

public int scanGrammarFile() 
This function will scan the grammar file and populate the corresponding Data 
Structures Keywords, Operators, Punctuation, Brackets  
Specified by: 
scanGrammarFile in interface Tokenizer 
Returns: 
Returns 0 on success Returns -1 if the grammar file had some errors in it. 
 

public int openSourceCode(java.lang.String sourcecodefilename) 
This function opens the source code and sets up the buffered reader...  
Specified by: 
openSourceCode in interface Tokenizer 
Parameters: 
sourcecodefilename - Filename of the source code  
Returns: 
- it returns 0 if it is able to open the file specified  
-if unable to open the file it returns -1 
 

public Token getNextToken() 
This function should return the next token from the source code it scans the 
source code and finds the next token from the code and returns it  
Specified by: 
getNextToken in interface Tokenizer 
Returns: 
Returns a token if eof not reached otherwise returns null 
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

java.lang.Object 
  LexicalAnalyzer.Token 
 
public class Token 
extends java.lang.Object 
Tokens are the basic constructs of a programming language. Tokens are the basic 
elements that helps in forming the programming Language There could be various type 
of tokens. The ones that are included here are 
KEYWORDS,IDENTIFIERS,CONSTANTS,OPERATORS,PUNCTUATIONS,BRACK
ETS and PREPROCESSOR  
 
Nested Class Summary 
static class Token.TokenType  
          Describes the type of token. 
   
Constructor Summary 
Token()  
          Token constructor  
Token(java.lang.String TokenName, Token.TokenType Tokentype, 
int linenum)  
          Token constructor 
 
Token(Token t)  
          Token duplicator constructor  
   
 
 
   
Method Summary 
 int getLineNumber()  
          Returns the line number where the token was found 
 java.lang.String getName()  
          REturns the Name of this token.. 
 Token.TokenType getType()  
          Returns the type of token It could be 
KEYWORDS,IDENTIFIERS,CONSTANTS,OPERATORS 
,PUNCTUATIONS,BRACKETS,PREPROC 
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Methods inherited from class java.lang.Object 
clone, equals, finalize, getClass, hashCode, notify, notifyAll, 
toString, wait, wait, wait 
   
Constructor Detail 

public Token() 
Token constructor  
 

public Token(Token t) 
Token duplicator constructor  
 

public Token(java.lang.String TokenName, 
             Token.TokenType Tokentype, 
             int linenum) 
Token constructor  
 
Method Detail 

public java.lang.String getName() 
REturns the Name of this token..  
 

public Token.TokenType getType() 
Returns the type of token It could be 
KEYWORDS,IDENTIFIERS,CONSTANTS,OPERATORS,PUNCTUATIONS,B
RACKETS,PREPROC  
 

public int getLineNumber() 
Returns the line number where the token was found  
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

java.lang.Object 
  Parser.CParser 
 
public class CParser 
extends java.lang.Object 
This is the parser for the C Language. It is no way a generic parser right now. This parser 
could be broken easily Go ahead and try it and YOU will know..... This parser is just 
going to look for specific type of code constructs and specific type of problems..... But it 
does a good job of what ever it does Its good in its own way.. But if you get in any source 
code that can be parsed through this , this is definitely going to find out a small set of 
vulnerabilities (if the source code has any)....... I am confident atleast to that point :)  
 
Field Summary 
 int constructor_error  
            
 
Constructor Summary 
CParser(java.lang.String sourcecodefile)  
             
   
Method Summary 
 void parseSourceCode()  
          This function is going to parse the source code.. 
 
   
Methods inherited from class java.lang.Object 
clone, equals, finalize, getClass, hashCode, notify, notifyAll, 
toString, wait, wait, wait 
   
Field Detail 

public int constructor_error 
Constructor Detail 
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
public CParser(java.lang.String sourcecodefile) 
Method Detail 

public void parseSourceCode() 
This function is going to parse the source code.. I.e it is going to ask the tokenizer 
to provide tokens one by one and it is going to construct the statement with the 
provided tokens.... After each statement this calls the Analyze statement function 
..  
 


java.lang.Object 
  ProgramElements.Block 
 
public class Block 
extends java.lang.Object 
Block represent a anything within a { ... } When ever a source code contains a "{" token 
then a new block should be created A block can have variables in side it.  
 
Constructor Summary 
Block()  
          A constructor with no parameters  
Block(int blocklevel)  
          Constructor with one parameter, an integer value  
   
Method Summary 
 int addVariable(Variable var)  
          Adds a variable to the current block. 
 Variable[] getAllVariables()  
          Returns a list of all the variables declared inside the currentblock 
 int getLevel()  
          Setter for level member variable 
 Variable getVariable(java.lang.String variablename)  
          Gets a variable from the current block 
 int noOfVariables()  
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          Returns the total no of variables that was declared inside the block 
 int removeVariable(java.lang.String variablename)  
          Removes a variable from this block 
 void setLevel(int level)  
          Setter for level member variable 
 int UpdateVariable(Variable v)  
          Updates a variable with new values found from in the input 
parameter 
   
Methods inherited from class java.lang.Object 
clone, equals, finalize, getClass, hashCode, notify, notifyAll, 
toString, wait, wait, wait 
   
Constructor Detail 

public Block() 
A constructor with no parameters  
 

public Block(int blocklevel) 
Constructor with one parameter, an integer value  
Parameters: 
blocklevel - - An integer value that specifies the level of this block 
 
 
 
 
Method Detail 

public int addVariable(Variable var) 
Adds a variable to the current block. It returns the new size of the variables list  
 

public Variable getVariable(java.lang.String variablename) 
Gets a variable from the current block  
Parameters: 
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variablename - - Name of the variable that needs to be retrieved  
Returns: 
- Returns a variable if a variable with specified variable name exists in this block..  
otherwise returns null 
 

public int removeVariable(java.lang.String variablename) 
Removes a variable from this block  
Parameters: 
the - Name of the variable that needs to be removed from the current block  
Returns: 
Integer value that denotes success or failure of this removevariable call 
 

public int UpdateVariable(Variable v) 
Updates a variable with new values found from in the input parameter  
Parameters: 
Specifies - the Variable that needs t 
 

public int noOfVariables() 
Returns the total no of variables that was declared inside the block  
 

public Variable[] getAllVariables() 
Returns a list of all the variables declared inside the currentblock  
Returns: 
Returns an array of Variable objects 
 

public int getLevel() 
Setter for level member variable  
Returns: 
- integer value that specifies the block level 
 

public void setLevel(int level) 
Setter for level member variable  
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Parameters: 
level - - Integer that denotes the level of this current block 
 


java.lang.Object 
  ProgramElements.Class 
 
public class Class 
extends java.lang.Object 
class "Class" represents a class in a program. A class can contain variables, functions....  
 
Constructor Summary 
Class(java.lang.String classname)  
             
   
Method Summary 
 void addFunction(Function f)  
          Adds a function to the class... 
 void addVariable(Variable var)  
          Adds a variable to the class.. 
 boolean containsFunction(Function function)  
          Tells whether specified function exitis in the class 
 Function getFunction(java.lang.String functionname)  
          Given a functionname this method Returns the corresponding function 
from a class if no function with specified name exists in the class then this 
returns null 
 Variable getVariable(java.lang.String variablename)  
          Given a variable name this returns the variable object 
   
Methods inherited from class java.lang.Object 
clone, equals, finalize, getClass, hashCode, notify, notifyAll, 
toString, wait, wait, wait 
   
Constructor Detail 
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
public Class(java.lang.String classname) 
Method Detail 

public void addFunction(Function f) 
Adds a function to the class...  
Parameters: 
Function - f that needs to be added to the current class 
 

public Function getFunction(java.lang.String functionname) 
Given a functionname this method Returns the corresponding function from a 
class if no function with specified name exists in the class then this returns null  
Parameters: 
Name - of the function  
Returns: 
Returns the function if present otherwise returns a null object 
 

public boolean containsFunction(Function function) 
Tells whether specified function exitis in the class  
 

public void addVariable(Variable var) 
Adds a variable to the class.. This goes in to the global spacee  
 

public Variable getVariable(java.lang.String variablename) 
Given a variable name this returns the variable object  
Parameters: 
Variable - name thats needs to be retrieved from the class  
Returns: 
Returns the instance of the variable if the variable with speified name is found  
otherwise returns null 
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

java.lang.Object 
  ProgramElements.Function 
 
public class Function 
extends java.lang.Object 
This class represents a Function in program Function has a name , type , parameters, and 
various other members in it.  
 
Constructor Summary 
Function(java.lang.String functionname, java.lang.String functiontype)  
             
Function(java.lang.String functionname, java.lang.String functiontype, 
int numparameters)  
          Public construtor for this class 
 
   
Method Summary 
 void addBlock(Block b)  
          Adds a block to the current function 
 void addBlock(int level)  
          Adds a block to the current function 
 int addVariable(Variable v, int blocklevel)  
          This function adds a variable at the specified block level, to 
this function object. 
 Variable findInStack(Variable var, int offset)  
          Finds a variable in stack .... 
 Variable[] getAllVariables()  
          This function returns an array of all the variables that are 
declared inside the current function 
 Block getBlock(int blocklevel)  
          This should return the block with the specified block level 
 java.lang.String getName()  
          getter Method for name member variable. 
 int getNoofparams()  
          Getter for no of parameter member variable 
 java.lang.String getParameters()  
          Getter for parameters member variable 
 java.lang.String getType()  
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          Getter for the type member variable 
 Variable getVariable(java.lang.String variablename)  
          This function will return the variable with corresponsding 
variable name This function will check each and everyblock in the 
reverse order. 
 void removeBlock(int blocklevel)  
            
 void setName(java.lang.String name)  
          Setter for name member variable. 
 void setNoofparams(int noofparams)  
          Setter for no of parameters 
 void setParameters(java.lang.String parameters)  
          setter for parameters member function 
 void setType(java.lang.String type)  
          Setter for type member variable 
 int UpdateVariable(Variable var)  
          Should update the variable with appropriate new values 
   
Methods inherited from class java.lang.Object 
clone, equals, finalize, getClass, hashCode, notify, notifyAll, 
toString, wait, wait, wait 
   
Constructor Detail 

public Function(java.lang.String functionname, 
                java.lang.String functiontype, 
                int numparameters) 
Public construtor for this class  
 

public Function(java.lang.String functionname, 
                java.lang.String functiontype) 
Method Detail 

public void addBlock(int level) 
Adds a block to the current function  
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
public void addBlock(Block b) 
Adds a block to the current function  
 

public Block getBlock(int blocklevel) 
This should return the block with the specified block level  
 

public void removeBlock(int blocklevel) 
 

public Variable getVariable(java.lang.String variablename) 
This function will return the variable with corresponsding variable name This 
function will check each and everyblock in the reverse order. i.e if there are two 
variables with same name it will always return the instance that was declared 
more recently..  
Parameters: 
variable - name - Name of the variable that you are looking for...  
Returns: 
returns the Variable if found else returns null 
 

public int addVariable(Variable v, 
                       int blocklevel) 
This function adds a variable at the specified block level, to this function object.  
Parameters: 
Variable - v - The variable that needs to be added to the function  
int blocklevel - The block to which the variable should be added  
Returns: 
integer value that specifies if it was able to or not able to add the variable to this 
function  
return value of -1 denotes that add resulted in a failure otherwise success. 
 

public int UpdateVariable(Variable var) 
Should update the variable with appropriate new values  
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
public java.lang.String getName() 
getter Method for name member variable.  
Returns: 
returns a string that denotes the name of this variable 
 

public void setName(java.lang.String name) 
Setter for name member variable.  
Parameters: 
- - The name of this variable 
 

public Variable[] getAllVariables() 
This function returns an array of all the variables that are declared inside the 
current function  
Returns: 
- Returns a Variable[] , an array of variable 
 

public Variable findInStack(Variable var, 
                            int offset) 
Finds a variable in stack .... Useful in cases where a an operand in a program is 
specified with its relative address.. For example assume a function has three 
variables int a,b,c... A is pushed onto the stack, then B and then C, So is on top 
now.. Now variable a can be represented by a , or b+4 or c+8 ... All of them refers 
to a. So in order to know what exactly is b+4 the program needs to take a look at 
function's stack and need to see the variable that is offsetted by 4 bytes from b. So 
this function will help in dereferencing those types of stuff.......  
Parameters: 
var - - Variable that acts as the starting point ( example if a is referred to as b+4 
then b is the variable and 4 is the offset 
offset - - Integer value that specifies the offset value. It may be negative or 
positive  
Returns: 
- Returns a variable that was reffered by expression var+offset ... if there is a 
variable at specified offset then it returns that variable , otherwise it returns NULL 
 

public java.lang.String getType() 
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Getter for the type member variable  
Returns: 
- Returns the data type of this function as a string 
 

public void setType(java.lang.String type) 
Setter for type member variable  
Parameters: 
type - - String that specifies the data type of the Function 
 

public int getNoofparams() 
Getter for no of parameter member variable  
Returns: 
Returns the No of parameters in the function prototype 
 

public void setNoofparams(int noofparams) 
Setter for no of parameters  
Parameters: 
noofparams - - integer value that specifies the no of parameters in function 
prototype 
 

public java.lang.String getParameters() 
Getter for parameters member variable  
Returns: 
A string that specifies the parameters of the function 
 

public void setParameters(java.lang.String parameters) 
setter for parameters member function  
Parameters: 
parameters - - A string that represent the parameters of this function. It could be 
int a , int b or something similar 
 

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
java.lang.Object 
  ProgramElements.Statement 
 
public class Statement 
extends java.lang.Object 
Statements are the basic building blocks of a program. A program is made up of multiple 
statements And each statement is made up of multiple tokens.  
 
Constructor Summary 
Statement()  
          Constructor  
   
Method Summary 
 void addToken(Token t)  
          Adds token to the end of the statement 
 boolean contains(java.lang.String value)  
          Check if the statement currents a token with specified name 
 Token getLastToken()  
          returns a token from the end of the statement 
 Token getNextToken()  
          returns the next token in the statement 
 int getNoOfTokens()  
          returns the total no of tokens in the statement 
 boolean isAssignmentStatement()  
          ofcourse this will not detect a assignment statement if it has a 
conditional statement inside it..... 
 boolean isComparisonStatement()  
          This function analyzes the current statement and returns a boolean value 
that specifies if this statement is an assignment statement or not. 
 int occurences(java.lang.String value)  
          returns the no of occurences of a particular tokenname in a statement* 
 void printStatement()  
          Prints the current statement 
 void pushToken(Token t)  
          Adds the token to the beginning of the tokens list now when u call 
statement.getNextToken this will be sent out first 
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Methods inherited from class java.lang.Object 
clone, equals, finalize, getClass, hashCode, notify, notifyAll, 
toString, wait, wait, wait 
   
Constructor Detail 

public Statement() 
Constructor  
Method Detail 

public void addToken(Token t) 
Adds token to the end of the statement  
Parameters: 
Token - that needs to be inserted into the statement 
 

public Token getNextToken() 
returns the next token in the statement  
Returns: 
The next available token in the statement 
 

public int getNoOfTokens() 
returns the total no of tokens in the statement  
 

public void pushToken(Token t) 
Adds the token to the beginning of the tokens list now when u call 
statement.getNextToken this will be sent out first  
 

public boolean contains(java.lang.String value) 
Check if the statement currents a token with specified name  
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
public int occurences(java.lang.String value) 
returns the no of occurences of a particular tokenname in a statement*  
Parameters: 
Token - name that needs to be found in the statement  
Returns: 
The no of occurences of the token 
 

public boolean isAssignmentStatement() 
ofcourse this will not detect a assignment statement if it has a conditional 
statement inside it..... for ex this will detecct a = b or a= b=c as assignement 
statements but it will not detect the following statement as assignment statement a 
= (a<=b)?0:1;  
 

public boolean isComparisonStatement() 
This function analyzes the current statement and returns a boolean value that 
specifies if this statement is an assignment statement or not.  
Returns: 
- Boolean value that true if its an assignment statement , otherwise false 
 

public Token getLastToken() 
returns a token from the end of the statement  
 

public void printStatement() 
Prints the current statement  
 



java.lang.Object 
  ProgramElements.Variable 
 
public class Variable 
extends java.lang.Object 
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This class represent a variable object.....  
 
Constructor Summary 
Variable(java.lang.String varname, java.lang.String vartype, 
boolean isUnsigned)  
          constructor 
 
Variable(java.lang.String varname, java.lang.String vartype, 
boolean isUnsigned, int pointerDepth)  
          constructor 
 
   
Method Summary 
 void duplicateVariable(Variable sourceVariable)  
          copies the values and other properties of one variable in to 
the other variable 
 int getArraySize()  
          Returns the array size 
 int getFlags()  
          Returns the flag value of this variable 
 int getLength()  
            
 int getMallocSize()  
          Returns the malloc size 
 java.lang.String getName()  
          Returns the Name of the Variable 
 int getPointerDepth()  
          Returns the pointer depth of the variable 
 java.lang.String getPointsto()  
            
 int getSize()  
          Returns the size of the variable* 
 java.lang.String getType()  
          Returns the type of this vairble, May be int, float, short, 
long, double,char etc., 
 java.lang.String getValue()  
          returns the value of the variable 
 boolean isArray()  
          returns boolean value that says if this variable is an array 
 boolean isHas_alias()  
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          This function returns a boolean value that specifies if the 
variable has an alias... 
 boolean isInitialized()  
          Returns if the variable is initialized or not 
 boolean isNullChecked()  
          Returns if the variable is Nullchecked after malloc or not... 
 boolean isUnsigned()  
          Getter method of unsigned member variable 
 void setArray(boolean isarray)  
          Sets the array boolean flag 
 void setArraySize(int Size)  
          Sets the array size of the variable 
 void setFlags(int Flag)  
          Sets the flag value of this variable 
 void setHas_alias(boolean has_alias)  
          Setter for has_alias member variable 
 void setInitialized()  
          Sets the initialized flag to true 
 void setLength(int length)  
            
 void setMallocSize(int msize)  
          Sets the Malloc size 
 void setName(java.lang.String Name)  
          Sets the name of this variables 
 void setNullCheck(boolean nullCheck)  
          Sets the null check flag to true 
 void setPointerDepth(int pointerDepth)  
          Sets the pointer depth of the variable 
 void setPointsto(java.lang.String pointsto)  
          Function that sets the value for points to member variable of 
this class 
 void setSize(int Size)  
          Sets the size of the variable.. 
 void setType(java.lang.String Type)  
          Sets the data type of this variable. 
 void setUnsigned(boolean unsigned)  
          Setter for unsigned member variable 
 void setValue(java.lang.String Value)  
          Sets the value of the variable 
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 void toggleNullCheck()  
          toggles null check 
   
Methods inherited from class java.lang.Object 
clone, equals, finalize, getClass, hashCode, notify, notifyAll, 
toString, wait, wait, wait 
   
Constructor Detail 

public Variable(java.lang.String varname, 
                java.lang.String vartype, 
                boolean isUnsigned) 
constructor  
 

public Variable(java.lang.String varname, 
                java.lang.String vartype, 
                boolean isUnsigned, 
                int pointerDepth) 
constructor  
 
Method Detail 

public java.lang.String getName() 
Returns the Name of the Variable  
Returns: 
- String Name - Name of this Variable 
 

public void setName(java.lang.String Name) 
Sets the name of this variables  
Parameters: 
Name - = Name that needs to assigned to this variable 
 

public java.lang.String getType() 
Returns the type of this vairble, May be int, float, short, long, double,char etc.,  
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Returns: 
Type - Specifies the data type of this variable 
 

public void setType(java.lang.String Type) 
Sets the data type of this variable.  
Parameters: 
Type - - The data type of the variable 
 

public java.lang.String getValue() 
returns the value of the variable  
Returns: 
String representing the value of the variable 
 

public void setValue(java.lang.String Value) 
Sets the value of the variable  
Parameters: 
Value - - Value that needs to be assigned to the variable 
 

public boolean isInitialized() 
Returns if the variable is initialized or not  
Returns: 
boolean value that is true if the variable is initialized , false otherwise 
 

public void setInitialized() 
Sets the initialized flag to true  
 

public boolean isNullChecked() 
Returns if the variable is Nullchecked after malloc or not...  
Returns: 
boolean value that is true if the variable is null checked , false otherwise 
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
public void setNullCheck(boolean nullCheck) 
Sets the null check flag to true  
 

public void toggleNullCheck() 
toggles null check  
 

public void setPointerDepth(int pointerDepth) 
Sets the pointer depth of the variable  
Parameters: 
int - pointerdepth - value that denotes the pointer depth of the variable if the 
variable is int *a; then pointerdepth = 1 , if variable is int **a; then pointerdepth 
should be 2. 
 

public int getPointerDepth() 
Returns the pointer depth of the variable  
Returns: 
integer value that denotes the pointer depth of the variable 
 

public int getSize() 
Returns the size of the variable*  
Returns: 
Returns an integer value that denotes the size of the variable rather the size of the 
data type of the variable 
 

public void setSize(int Size) 
Sets the size of the variable.. Actually variable's size is set in the constructor 
automatically based on the data type of the variable. But this function is provide 
in case the size has to be modified manually for some reason  
Parameters: 
size - of the variable 
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
public int getArraySize() 
Returns the array size  
Returns: 
if the variable is an array it returns the size of the array otherwise returns 0 
 

public void setArraySize(int Size) 
Sets the array size of the variable  
Parameters: 
Integer - value that denotes the size of the array. if its int a[10] then 10 is the 
size of the array 
 

public void setFlags(int Flag) 
Sets the flag value of this variable  
Parameters: 
Integer - value that denotes the flag value of this variable As of now i am using 
only flag value = 1 which is TAINTED FLAG and it is set if the variable receives 
input from user 
 

public int getFlags() 
Returns the flag value of this variable  
Returns: 
Returns an integer value that denotes the flag value of this variable 
 

public void duplicateVariable(Variable sourceVariable) 
copies the values and other properties of one variable in to the other variable  
Parameters: 
Variable - from this the value and other properties has to be copied in to the 
current(this) variable 
 

public int getMallocSize() 
Returns the malloc size  
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
public void setMallocSize(int msize) 
Sets the Malloc size  
 

public boolean isArray() 
returns boolean value that says if this variable is an array  
 

public void setArray(boolean isarray) 
Sets the array boolean flag  
 

public int getLength() 
 

public void setLength(int length) 
 

public java.lang.String getPointsto() 
 

public void setPointsto(java.lang.String pointsto) 
Function that sets the value for points to member variable of this class  
 

public boolean isHas_alias() 
This function returns a boolean value that specifies if the variable has an alias... 
(Only for variables with pointer depth >0 or rather Pointers)  
 

public void setHas_alias(boolean has_alias) 
Setter for has_alias member variable  
 
120 
 
 

public boolean isUnsigned() 
Getter method of unsigned member variable  
Returns: 
True if the variable is an unsigned variable, otherwise false. 
 

public void setUnsigned(boolean unsigned) 
Setter for unsigned member variable  
Parameters: 
unsigned - - boolean value that specifies if the variable is unsigned or not 
